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  A	  major	  driver	  of	  climate	  change	  today	  in	  developing	  countries	  is	  deforestation.	  Forests	  store	  carbon	  and	  are	  known	  as	  carbon	  sinks.	  When	  carbon	  sinks	  are	  destroyed,	  carbon	  dioxide	  is	  released	  into	  the	  atmosphere.	  This	  contributes	  to	  the	  greenhouse	  effect	  and	  contributes	  to	  global	  warming.	  A	  solution	  to	  conserve	  forests	  and	  maintain	  carbon	  sinks	  in	  developing	  countries	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme.	  Many	  people	  who	  live	  in	  the	  most	  biodiverse	  forests	  in	  developing	  countries	  are	  indigenous	  peoples	  or	  forest	  dependent	  peoples.	  I	  argue	  that	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  may	  undermine	  the	  local	  management	  of	  resources	  by	  focusing	  on	  more	  national	  and	  international	  levels	  of	  resource	  management	  if	  key	  factors	  surrounding	  decentralized	  forest	  management	  are	  not	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  REDD+	  programs.	  I	  provide	  recommendations	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  address	  local	  concerns	  and	  hold	  to	  more	  decentralized	  levels	  of	  land	  management.	  I	  gathered	  preliminary	  data	  and	  analyzed	  three	  case	  studies	  of	  Ecuador,	  Indonesia,	  and	  Tanzania	  to	  explore	  the	  potential	  effects	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  may	  have	  on	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  forest	  dependent	  peoples.	  I	  found	  that	  key	  factors	  surrounding	  decentralized	  forest	  management	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  or	  indigenous	  peoples’	  and	  forest	  dependent	  peoples’	  land	  management	  will	  be	  undermined	  with	  the	  land	  management	  following	  a	  centralized	  approach.	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   Climate	  change	  is	  a	  topic	  often	  discussed	  today	  because	  of	  the	  detrimental	  implications	  it	  has	  on	  our	  world’s	  forests,	  oceans,	  and	  extreme	  weather	  events.	  Developed	  countries	  are	  seen	  as	  the	  agents	  of	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  these	  countries	  industrialized	  immensely,	  without	  knowledge	  or	  care	  that	  large	  amounts	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  and	  other	  pollutants	  were	  being	  emitted	  into	  the	  atmosphere	  and	  causing	  rising	  global	  temperatures.	  As	  research	  continues,	  the	  developed	  countries	  have	  realized	  the	  global	  implications	  of	  such	  high	  industrialization,	  such	  as	  the	  warming	  of	  climate	  (i.e.	  climate	  change)	  due	  to	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  produced	  by	  the	  burning	  of	  fossil	  fuels,	  and	  are	  seeking	  to	  combat	  climate	  change	  in	  various	  ways.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  developing	  countries	  of	  the	  world	  have	  contributed	  little	  in	  the	  past	  to	  cause	  climate	  change	  in	  terms	  of	  industrialization.	  	  Developing	  countries	  have	  contributed	  to	  climate	  change	  mostly	  through	  the	  process	  of	  deforestation.	  During	  photosynthesis,	  trees	  turn	  atmospheric	  carbon	  dioxide	  into	  oxygen,	  thus	  regulating	  the	  amount	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  in	  the	  air.	  When	  trees	  are	  cut	  down	  or	  burned,	  carbon	  dioxide	  is	  released	  into	  the	  air,	  thus	  contributing	  to	  the	  greenhouse	  effect.	  The	  greenhouse	  effect	  occurs	  when	  the	  concentration	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  (including	  carbon	  dioxide)	  increases	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  and	  traps	  solar	  energy,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  generates	  warmth	  (EPA;	  Berliner,	  2003,	  p.	  430).	  Developing	  countries	  take	  part	  in	  deforestation	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  sustain	  their	  livelihoods	  through	  agricultural	  practices,	  such	  as	  land	  clearing	  and	  slash-­‐and-­‐burn	  agriculture,	  and	  the	  sale	  of	  forest	  products,	  such	  as	  timber	  from	  the	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logging	  industry.	  These	  countries	  oftentimes	  have	  low	  levels	  of	  industrialization	  and	  the	  inhabitants	  lead	  more	  traditional	  lives.	  A	  number	  of	  these	  inhabitants	  are	  traditional	  forest	  users	  or	  members	  of	  indigenous	  groups,	  or	  groups	  that	  are	  ethnically	  distinct	  from	  the	  national	  identity.	  Many	  indigenous	  groups	  live	  off	  of	  the	  land’s	  resources	  and	  have	  their	  own	  traditional	  customs	  relating	  to	  the	  land	  and	  waters.	  	  Many	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  groups	  of	  traditional	  forest	  users	  also	  live	  in	  some	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  precious	  forests,	  which	  serve	  as	  carbon	  sinks.	  Deforestation	  is	  occurring	  in	  these	  forests	  because	  indigenous	  inhabitants,	  traditional	  forest	  users,	  national	  governments,	  and	  foreign	  proprietors	  reap	  economic	  profits	  from	  the	  sale	  of	  trees	  or	  land	  and	  natural	  resource	  exploitation,	  while	  forests	  are	  cleared	  to	  make	  room	  for	  agricultural	  production.	  Deforestation	  seriously	  harms	  these	  carbon	  sinks	  because,	  as	  trees	  are	  cut	  down,	  carbon	  dioxide	  is	  released	  into	  the	  atmosphere,	  which	  may	  contribute	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  climate	  change. 	   A	  proposed	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  Collaborative	  Programme	  on	  Reducing	  Emissions	  from	  Deforestation	  and	  Forest	  Degradation	  in	  Developing	  Countries	  (UN-­‐REDD),	  which	  creates	  partnerships	  between	  developed	  countries	  and	  developing	  countries	  to	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  in	  the	  atmosphere.	  In	  this	  program,	  funds	  are	  donated	  to	  developing	  countries	  with	  the	  agreement	  that	  the	  developing	  countries	  conserve	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  forest	  cover	  and,	  in	  effect,	  sequester	  carbon.	  As	  developed	  countries	  see	  this	  as	  a	  way	  to	  correct	  past	  mistakes,	  developing	  countries	  see	  this	  as	  a	  way	  to	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economically	  profit,	  while	  conserving	  some	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  valuable	  forests.	  The	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  groups	  of	  traditional	  forest	  users	  that	  reside	  in	  these	  countries	  see	  costs	  and	  benefits	  to	  the	  program.	  On	  one	  hand,	  if	  the	  funds	  are	  distributed	  correctly,	  these	  local	  peoples	  may	  be	  better	  off	  economically	  and	  may	  be	  able	  to	  sustain	  a	  higher	  quality	  of	  well-­‐being.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  forest	  users	  have	  traditional	  ways	  of	  managing	  the	  land	  and	  natural	  resources	  and	  the	  program	  could	  alter	  their	  livelihoods	  and	  historic	  customs.	   In	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  analyze	  how	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  can	  influence	  national	  level	  policy	  and	  how	  local	  land	  management	  by	  traditional	  forest	  users	  and	  indigenous	  groups	  may	  or	  may	  not	  fit	  with	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme.	  I	  will	  also	  be	  looking	  at	  whether	  or	  not	  national	  and	  international	  management	  of	  resources	  undermines	  local	  management	  of	  resources,	  as	  well	  as	  further	  marginalizing	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users.	  I	  will	  be	  analyzing	  this	  research	  through	  a	  search	  of	  the	  literature	  and	  performing	  a	  case	  study	  analysis.	  Case	  studies	  will	  be	  conducted	  on	  three	  countries,	  located	  in	  three	  different	  continents,	  that	  have	  expansive	  forests	  and	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users	  residing	  in	  these	  forests.	  The	  countries	  I	  will	  be	  looking	  at	  are	  Ecuador,	  Indonesia,	  and	  Tanzania.	  	  This	  thesis	  will	  be	  divided	  into	  five	  sections	  following	  the	  introduction.	  Section	  Two	  presents	  background	  information	  and	  consists	  of	  six	  subsections:	  (1)	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  Local	  Forest	  Users:	  Traditional	  Land	  Management	  (2)	  Climate	  Change,	  Deforestation,	  and	  Carbon	  Sinks	  (3)	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  (4)	  Ecuador	  (5)	  Indonesia	  and	  	  (6)	  Tanzania.	  Section	  Three	  describes	  the	  methods	  I	  will	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be	  using	  to	  analyze	  my	  findings.	  Section	  Four	  is	  composed	  of	  three	  sections	  that	  go	  into	  detail	  about	  each	  country	  case	  study:	  (1)	  Ecuador	  (2)	  Indonesia	  and	  (3)	  Tanzania.	  In	  Section	  Five,	  I	  analyze	  these	  findings	  and	  talk	  about	  the	  lessons	  learned	  from	  each	  separate	  case	  study.	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  and	  recommendations.	  In	  Section	  Six,	  I	  develop	  my	  conclusions	  about	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  and	  the	  implications	  it	  has	  for	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users,	  national	  governments,	  and	  international	  stakeholders,	  while	  supporting	  the	  notion	  that	  local	  group	  involvement	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  for	  UN-­‐REDD	  to	  be	  equitable	  and	  ethical. My	  premise	  holds	  that	  in	  developing	  countries	  where	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  is	  implemented,	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  tends	  to	  influence	  national	  level	  policy,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  fit	  in	  with	  how	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users	  are	  managing	  their	  land	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  The	  thesis	  I	  argue	  is	  that	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  may	  undermine	  the	  local	  management	  of	  resources	  by	  holding	  to	  more	  national	  and	  international	  levels	  of	  resource	  management	  if	  key	  factors	  surrounding	  decentralized	  forest	  management	  are	  not	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  REDD+	  programs.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  paper,	  I	  will	  provide	  recommendations	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  address	  local	  concerns	  and	  hold	  to	  more	  decentralized	  levels	  of	  land	  management.	  
 
Background	  This	  section	  consists	  of	  background	  information	  about	  the	  following:	  (1)	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  Local	  Forest	  Users:	  Traditional	  Land	  Management	  (2)	  Climate	  Change,	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Deforestation,	  and	  Carbon	  Sinks	  (3)	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  (4)	  Ecuador	  (5)	  Indonesia	  and	  	  (6)	  Tanzania.	  	  
Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  Local	  Forest	  Users:	  Traditional	  Land	  Management In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  be	  focusing	  on	  two	  groups	  of	  people:	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  local	  forest	  users,	  whom	  I	  will	  also	  refer	  to	  as	  forest	  dependent	  peoples,	  because	  both	  of	  these	  groups	  oftentimes	  rely	  on	  the	  forests	  for	  livelihood	  activities.	  Although	  both	  groups	  usually	  tend	  to	  have	  overlap	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  forest	  resource	  usage,	  Chao	  (2012)	  mentioned,	  “not	  all	  forest	  dependent	  peoples	  are	  necessarily	  indigenous	  peoples,	  although	  many	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  dependent	  on	  forests	  and	  other	  natural	  resources”	  (p.	  6).	  Therefore,	  I	  will	  explain	  the	  differences	  and	  similarities	  of	  each	  group.	   There	  are	  roughly	  250	  million	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  the	  world,	  which	  make	  up	  about	  5,000	  indigenous	  groups	  in	  the	  world,	  amounting	  to	  nearly	  3%	  of	  the	  total	  world	  population	  (Sobrevila,	  2008,	  p.	  3;	  Nepal,	  2002,	  p.	  748).	  In	  this	  work,	  indigenous	  peoples	  will	  be	  identified	  as	  “culturally	  distinct	  ethnic	  groups,	  who	  have	  a	  different	  identity	  from	  the	  national	  society,	  draw	  existence	  from	  local	  resources,	  and	  are	  politically	  nondominant”	  (Nepal,	  2002,	  p.	  749).	  Indigenous	  groups	  will	  be	  identified	  as	  certain	  distinct	  cultures,	  rather	  than	  defined	  as	  such,	  because	  of	  the	  discrimination	  produced	  by	  classifying	  a	  group	  or	  groups	  of	  people	  (UN	  Permanent	  Forum	  on	  Indigenous	  Issues).	  These	  groups	  maintain	  their	  own	  customs	  and	  languages	  apart	  from	  the	  dominant	  societal	  culture	  and	  have	  traditions	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  nature	  (Nepal,	  2002,	  p.	  749).	  Sobrevila’s	  (2002)	  work	  has	  classified	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indigenous	  peoples	  as	  a	  distinct	  group	  consisting	  of	  some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  following	  elements: (a)	  are	  the	  descendants	  of	  the	  original	  inhabitants	  of	  a	  territory	  that	  has	  been	  overcome	  by	  conquest;	  (b)	  are	  “ecosystem	  peoples,”	  such	  as	  shifting	  or	  permanent	  cultivators,	  herders,	  hunters	  and	  gatherers,	  fishers,	  and/or	  handicraft	  makers	  who	  adopt	  a	  multiuse	  strategy	  of	  appropriation	  of	  nature;	  (c)	  practice	  a	  small-­‐scale,	  labor-­‐intensive	  form	  of	  rural	  production	  that	  produces	  little	  surplus	  and	  has	  low	  energy	  needs;	  (d)	  do	  not	  have	  centralized	  political	  institutions,	  organize	  their	  life	  at	  the	  level	  of	  community,	  and	  make	  decisions	  on	  a	  consensus	  basis;	  (e)	  share	  a	  common	  language,	  religion,	  moral	  values,	  beliefs,	  clothing,	  and	  other	  identifying	  characteristics	  as	  well	  as	  a	  relationship	  to	  a	  particular	  territory;	  (f)	  have	  a	  different	  worldview,	  consisting	  of	  a	  custodial	  and	  nonmaterialistic	  attitude	  to	  land	  and	  natural	  resources	  based	  on	  a	  symbolic	  interchange	  with	  the	  natural	  universe;	  (g)	  are	  subjugated	  by	  a	  dominant	  culture	  and	  society;	  and	  (g)	  consist	  of	  individuals	  who	  subjectively	  consider	  themselves	  to	  be	  indigenous	  (3).	   Indigenous	  groups	  are	  often	  marginalized	  in	  society	  and	  are	  seen	  as	  impoverished	  groups	  of	  people;	  their	  traditional	  land	  management	  and	  cultural	  ways	  of	  life	  are	  often	  viewed	  as	  backward	  by	  dominant	  societal	  groups	  (Sobrevila,	  2002,	  p.	  xvi).	  The	  marginalization	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Western	  notion	  of	  industrialization	  and	  the	  modernization	  that	  accompanies	  it,	  pushing	  out	  traditional	  ways	  of	  thought	  and	  catering	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  elite	  members	  of	  society	  (Barnhardt	  &	  Kawagley,	  2005,	  p.	  9).	  Discrimination	  against	  indigenous	  peoples	  has	  led	  to	  their	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loss	  of	  land	  rights,	  lack	  of	  participation	  in	  governmental	  decision-­‐making	  processes,	  and	  meager	  access	  to	  healthcare,	  education,	  and	  adequate	  housing	  (UN	  Permanent	  Forum	  on	  Indigenous	  Issues,	  p.	  2).	  As	  indigenous	  groups	  of	  people	  are	  the	  minorities	  in	  various	  countries	  in	  the	  world,	  their	  history,	  customs,	  and	  deep	  connection	  to	  the	  land	  and	  natural	  resources	  cannot	  be	  forgotten	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  most	  of	  the	  majority	  who	  seeks	  modernization	  through	  industrialization.	  Many	  of	  these	  indigenous	  groups	  live	  in	  the	  world’s	  most	  biodiverse	  places;	  therefore	  I	  will	  be	  focusing	  on	  these	  groups	  and	  other	  forest	  dependent	  peoples	  in	  my	  work	  because	  these	  groups	  are	  crucial	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  programs	  against	  deforestation	  and	  in	  favor	  of	  forest	  conservation. Sobrevila	  (2008)	  has	  noted	  that	  more	  than	  20%	  of	  the	  world’s	  land	  area	  is	  inhabited	  by	  indigenous	  groups,	  with	  nearly	  80%	  of	  this	  area	  containing	  the	  world’s	  most	  precious	  biodiversity,	  exhibiting	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  indigenous	  land	  areas	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  biodiversity	  (p.	  xii).	  Many	  indigenous	  groups	  follow	  a	  holistic	  approach	  to	  land	  management,	  in	  which	  the	  land,	  water,	  plants,	  animals,	  humans,	  elements,	  and	  ecosystems	  play	  into	  one	  universal	  entity	  with	  interdependent	  parts	  (Barnhardt	  &	  Kawagley,	  2005,	  p.	  11).	  Indigenous	  knowledge	  varies	  from	  place	  to	  place	  and	  from	  group	  to	  group,	  but	  overall	  results	  from	  a	  learning	  process	  derived	  from	  direct	  interaction	  with,	  observation	  of,	  and	  demonstration	  of	  the	  land,	  its	  uses,	  and	  its	  resources	  (Barnhardt	  &	  Kawagley,	  2005,	  p.	  10).	  In	  this	  work,	  traditional	  knowledge	  of	  indigenous	  cultures	  will	  be	  defined	  as	  experiential	  knowledge	  with	  roots	  in	  a	  particular	  place,	  which	  has	  adapted	  over	  
8	  
time	  as	  the	  environment	  and	  availability	  of	  local	  resources	  change	  (Barnhardt	  &	  Kawagley,	  2005,	  p.	  11).	  Barnhardt	  and	  Kawagley	  (2005)	  noted	  “Although	  Western	  science	  and	  education	  tend	  to	  emphasize	  compartmentalized	  knowledge	  that	  is	  often	  decontextualized	  and	  taught	  in	  the	  detached	  setting	  of	  a	  classroom	  or	  laboratory,	  Indigenous	  people	  have	  traditionally	  acquired	  their	  knowledge	  through	  direct	  experience	  in	  the	  natural	  world”	  (p.	  11).	  As	  means	  of	  survival,	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  long	  lived	  off	  the	  land	  for	  food,	  tools,	  medicine,	  clothing,	  housing,	  and	  tribal	  customs,	  while	  learning	  from	  natural	  processes	  and	  respecting	  the	  land	  in	  its	  own	  right	  	  (Barnhardt	  &	  Kawagley,	  2005,	  p.	  10).	  Throughout	  modern	  times,	  traditional	  knowledge	  of	  land	  management	  has	  been	  disregarded	  and	  placed	  on	  the	  backburner	  to	  make	  way	  for	  Western	  science	  (Barnhardt	  &	  Kawagley,	  2005,	  p.	  9).	  Currently,	  there	  is	  a	  “paradigm	  shift”	  (p.	  9)	  occurring	  in	  the	  global	  society,	  in	  which	  recognition	  has	  been	  given	  to	  both	  indigenous	  knowledge	  and	  the	  realization	  that	  indigenous	  groups	  have	  had	  the	  adaptive	  capacity	  throughout	  millennia	  to	  respond	  to	  environmental	  changes	  (Barnhardt	  &	  Kawagley,	  2005,). In	  this	  work,	  local	  forest	  users	  or	  forest	  dependent	  peoples	  will	  be	  defined	  as	  people	  who	  are	  reliant	  on	  forest	  products	  for	  livelihood	  activities	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  alternatives	  (Fisher,	  Srimongkontip,	  &	  Veer,	  1997,	  p.	  4).	  Many	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  forest	  dependent	  peoples,	  but,	  as	  mentioned	  before,	  not	  all	  forest	  dependent	  peoples	  are	  indigenous	  peoples.	  Other	  forest	  dependent	  peoples	  include	  agriculturalists,	  hunter-­‐gatherers,	  and	  those	  taking	  part	  in	  swidden	  cultivation	  (Fisher,	  Srimongkontip,	  &	  Veer,	  1997,	  p.	  5).	  These	  people	  heavily	  rely	  on	  forest	  products	  for	  subsistence	  activities,	  but	  may	  also	  use	  forest	  products	  as	  a	  safeguard	  if	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agricultural	  crops	  fail	  or	  for	  extra	  income.	  Fisher,	  Srimongkontip,	  and	  Veer	  (1997)	  noted	  the	  various	  ways	  forests	  are	  used	  in	  livelihood	  activities,	  such	  as	  for	  “timber,	  fuelwood,	  wild	  food	  (animal	  and	  plant),	  non-­‐timber	  forest	  products,	  medicinal	  plants,	  grazing	  for	  animals,	  forest-­‐based	  agriculture,	  nutrient	  subsidies	  for	  agriculture,	  and	  food	  security”	  (p.	  6).	  Like	  indigenous	  peoples,	  many	  forest	  dependent	  peoples	  have	  lived	  in	  the	  same	  area	  for	  many	  years	  and	  some	  hold	  traditional	  views	  on	  land	  management.	  Although	  there	  are	  some	  forest	  dependent	  peoples	  who	  rely	  on	  the	  forest	  for	  income	  generation,	  such	  as	  loggers	  and	  mineral	  excavation,	  I	  will	  not	  be	  referring	  to	  these	  peoples	  in	  my	  work	  because	  they	  are	  dependent	  on	  the	  forests	  solely	  for	  monetary	  purposes	  and	  not	  for	  direct	  livelihood	  purposes. Land	  rights	  are	  an	  area	  often	  contested	  in	  terms	  of	  traditional	  land	  management.	  In	  many	  countries	  in	  the	  world,	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  forest	  dependent	  peoples	  are	  either	  removed	  from	  their	  traditional	  lands	  to	  preserve	  forests	  and	  biodiversity	  or	  have	  their	  land	  titles	  taken	  away,	  thus	  giving	  the	  state	  control	  of	  their	  land;	  this	  oftentimes	  leads	  to	  exploitation	  of	  the	  land	  and	  natural	  resources	  because	  the	  state	  will	  benefit	  from	  the	  economic	  growth	  spurred	  by	  foreign	  proprietors	  and	  development	  projects	  on	  these	  lands,	  such	  as	  oil	  and	  gas	  extraction	  projects	  (International	  Work	  Group	  for	  Indigenous	  Affairs).	  The	  International	  Work	  Group	  for	  Indigenous	  Affairs	  (IWGIA)	  has	  mentioned	  that	  “dominating	  development	  paradigms…	  perceive	  the	  modes	  of	  production	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  [and	  forest	  dependent	  peoples]-­‐	  such	  as	  pastoralism,	  hunting/gathering	  and	  rotational	  slash	  and	  burn	  agriculture-­‐	  as	  primitive,	  non-­‐
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productive	  and	  not	  in	  line	  with	  the	  modernization	  aspirations	  of	  present	  day	  states,”	  which	  leads	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  developing	  countries	  are	  taking	  away	  traditional	  land	  rights	  in	  an	  essence	  to	  stimulate	  modernization	  and	  economic	  growth.	  A	  large	  problem	  in	  the	  context	  of	  land	  rights	  is	  privatization	  of	  land	  versus	  collective	  ownership	  of	  land.	  As	  developing	  countries	  seek	  to	  modernize,	  private	  land	  ownership	  is	  favored	  because	  plots	  of	  land	  can	  be	  sold,	  thus	  spurring	  economic	  growth	  and	  natural	  resource	  exploitation,	  whereas	  collective	  land	  ownership	  under	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  forest	  dependent	  users	  continues	  to	  be	  undermined	  due	  to	  its	  lack	  of	  economic	  profitability	  (IWGIA).	  
 
Climate	  Change,	  Deforestation,	  and	  Carbon	  Sinks 
	   The	  first	  international	  recognition	  of	  climate	  change	  arose	  from	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (IPCC),	  where	  climate	  change	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  potential	  global	  issue	  affecting	  the	  environment	  and	  ecosystems	  (Berliner,	  2003,	  p.	  430).	  Although	  there	  are	  still	  uncertainties	  surrounding	  the	  precise	  effects	  climate	  change	  will	  have	  on	  the	  world,	  it	  is	  generally	  believed	  that	  anthropogenic	  agents	  are	  large	  contributors	  to	  the	  warming	  of	  our	  climate.	  According	  to	  the	  US	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  (EPA),	  “over	  the	  past	  century,	  human	  activities	  have	  released	  large	  amounts	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  and	  other	  greenhouse	  gases	  into	  the	  atmosphere.”	  These	  gases	  are	  released	  by	  deforestation,	  energy	  production	  by	  the	  burning	  of	  fossil	  fuels,	  and	  some	  agricultural	  processes,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  minor	  factors	  (EPA).	  Trees	  store	  carbon	  and	  forests	  thus	  can	  be	  deemed	  carbon	  sinks.	  During	  photosynthesis,	  trees	  turn	  atmospheric	  carbon	  dioxide	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into	  oxygen,	  thus	  regulating	  the	  amount	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  in	  the	  air.	  When	  trees	  are	  cut	  down	  or	  burned,	  carbon	  dioxide	  is	  released	  into	  the	  air,	  thus	  contributing	  to	  the	  greenhouse	  effect.	  The	  greenhouse	  effect	  occurs	  when	  the	  concentration	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  increases	  in	  the	  atmosphere,	  which	  traps	  solar	  energy	  and	  generates	  warmth	  (EPA;	  Berliner,	  2003,	  p.	  430).	  	  The	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  include	  rising	  sea	  levels,	  more	  variability	  in	  extreme	  weather	  events,	  decreases	  in	  snow	  and	  ice	  cover,	  and	  increased	  precipitation.	  The	  most	  prevalent	  greenhouse	  gas	  causing	  climate	  change	  is	  carbon	  dioxide.	  The	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC)	  established	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  in	  1997,	  which	  introduces	  mitigation	  mechanisms	  to	  reduce	  the	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  (Streck	  &	  Scholz,	  2006,	  p.	  862;	  UNFCCC).	  The	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  introduced	  the	  CDM,	  or	  Clean	  Development	  Mechanism,	  which	  allows	  developed	  countries	  to	  reduce	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  abroad	  in	  developing	  countries	  by	  the	  construction	  of	  renewable	  technologies	  or	  implementation	  of	  other	  sustainable	  practices	  (Streck	  &	  Scholz,	  2006,	  p.	  862;	  UNFCCC).	  According	  to	  Streck	  and	  Scholz	  (2006),	  since	  “the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  does	  not	  address	  forest	  conservation	  or	  prevention	  of	  deforestation,	  tropical	  countries	  are	  restricted	  in	  their	  opportunities	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  CDM”	  (p.	  862),	  thus	  showing	  the	  necessity	  for	  a	  framework	  that	  includes	  carbon	  sequestration	  in	  forests	  as	  a	  viable	  mitigation	  solution	  to	  climate	  change. 	   Terrestrial	  ecosystems,	  the	  oceans,	  and	  the	  atmosphere	  are	  interdependent	  parts	  of	  the	  carbon	  cycle;	  carbon	  is	  stored	  in	  the	  oceans,	  soils,	  and	  vegetation,	  which	  reduces	  the	  concentration	  of	  atmospheric	  CO2,	  thus	  aiding	  in	  carbon	  sequestration	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(Streck	  &	  Scholz,	  2006,	  p.	  863).	  Streck	  and	  Scholz	  (2006)	  noted	  that	  nearly	  60%	  of	  terrestrial	  ecosystems’	  carbon	  storage	  is	  found	  in	  forest	  ecosystems,	  as	  well	  as	  “accounting	  for	  90%	  of	  the	  annual	  carbon	  flux	  between	  the	  atmosphere	  and	  the	  earth’s	  land	  surface”	  (p.	  863),	  exhibiting	  the	  importance	  of	  forests	  in	  our	  world	  today.	  In	  forest	  ecosystems,	  carbon	  is	  stored	  in	  the	  soil	  and	  woody	  biomass;	  as	  the	  number	  of	  trees	  and	  amount	  of	  organic	  soil	  increase,	  carbon	  accumulation	  occurs-­‐-­‐	  creating	  a	  carbon	  sink	  (Streck	  &	  Scholz,	  2006,	  p.	  863).	  Within	  the	  last	  140	  years,	  deforestation	  from	  the	  logging	  industry	  and	  clear	  felling	  has	  led	  to	  a	  global	  decrease	  in	  forested	  area	  by	  nearly	  20%	  (Streck	  &	  Scholz,	  2006,	  p.	  865).	  	  Land-­‐use	  change	  and	  agricultural	  cultivation	  have	  also	  led	  to	  the	  clearing	  of	  forests,	  and,	  effectually,	  to	  increases	  in	  carbon	  dioxide	  emissions.	  Deforestation	  accounts	  for	  nearly	  25%	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  produced	  today	  because,	  as	  trees	  are	  cut	  down	  or	  burned,	  carbon	  dioxide	  is	  released	  into	  the	  atmosphere	  (Streck	  &	  Scholz,	  2006,	  p.	  862).	  When	  trees	  are	  kept	  intact	  and	  forests	  are	  maintained,	  carbon	  is	  stored.	  	  Most	  of	  our	  world’s	  valuable	  biological	  resources	  are	  found	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  but	  are	  continuously	  put	  at	  risk	  due	  to	  natural	  resource	  extraction,	  larger-­‐scale	  agricultural	  practices,	  and	  exploitation	  by	  foreign	  proprietors.	  While	  the	  developed	  world	  mainly	  releases	  carbon	  dioxide	  through	  industrial	  practices	  and	  energy	  production,	  the	  largest	  emitter	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  in	  tropical	  developing	  countries	  is	  the	  reduction	  in	  forest	  area	  due	  to	  anthropogenic	  changes	  in	  land-­‐use	  (Streck	  &	  Scholz,	  2006,	  p.	  864).	  Although	  reforestation	  and	  afforestation	  seem	  like	  viable	  solutions	  to	  increasing	  stored	  carbon,	  carbon	  stocks	  take	  many	  years	  to	  build	  and	  rebuild	  and	  will	  not	  be	  effective	  in	  mitigating	  climate	  change	  at	  this	  present	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moment	  in	  the	  short	  term	  (Streck	  &	  Scholz,	  2006,	  p.	  865).	  The	  only	  solution	  to	  sequester	  carbon	  effectively	  is	  decreasing	  the	  deforestation	  rate	  because	  more	  forested	  area	  will	  result	  in	  more	  stored	  carbon	  and	  less	  carbon	  dioxide	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  (Streck	  &	  Scholz,	  2006,	  p.	  865).	  	  
 
UN-­REDD	  Programme 	   The	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme,	  which	  stands	  for	  the	  United	  Nations	  Programme	  on	  Reducing	  Emissions	  from	  Deforestation	  and	  Forest	  Degradation,	  was	  established	  by	  the	  UNFCCC	  in	  2008	  to	  reduce	  carbon	  dioxide	  emissions	  by	  forest	  conservation	  and	  restoration	  in	  developing	  countries	  (UN-­‐REDD,	  2008,	  p.	  2;	  Alexander	  et.	  al,	  2011,	  p.	  683).	  This	  program	  was	  established	  to	  aid	  developing	  countries	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  implementation	  of	  REDD+	  actions,	  or	  actions	  that	  refer	  to	  “reducing	  emissions	  from	  deforestation	  and	  forest	  degradation	  in	  developing	  countries	  [by]	  conservation,	  sustainable	  management	  of	  forests	  and	  enhancement	  of	  forest	  carbon	  stocks”	  (UN-­‐REDD	  Strategy,	  p.	  1).	  REDD	  stands	  for	  “Reducing	  Emissions	  from	  Deforestation	  and	  Forest	  Degradation”	  in	  general	  (International	  Union	  for	  Conservation	  of	  Nature).	  The	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  is	  an	  overarching	  institution	  that	  provides	  funding,	  knowledge,	  and	  capacity	  building	  for	  developing	  countries	  that	  would	  like	  to	  implement	  national	  REDD+	  programs.	  The	  UN-­‐REDD	  Framework	  Document	  mentions	  that	  the	  Food	  and	  Agricultural	  Organization	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (FAO),	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme	  (UNDP),	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Environment	  Programme	  (UNEP)	  collaborate	  with	  partner	  countries	  and	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donor	  countries	  to	  provide	  expertise	  and	  technical	  assistance	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  forest	  conservation	  and	  restoration	  (UN-­‐REDD,	  2008,	  p.	  6).	  	  In	  the	  implementation	  of	  this	  program,	  there	  are	  prevalent	  issues	  that	  need	  to	  be	  evaluated.	  As	  the	  developing	  countries	  of	  the	  world	  are	  located	  in	  different	  regions	  with	  different	  climates	  and	  reasons	  for	  deforestation,	  local	  approaches	  will	  need	  to	  be	  used	  because	  a	  general,	  top-­‐down	  policy	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  in	  addressing	  the	  diversity	  of	  problems	  (UN-­‐REDD,	  2008,	  p.	  2).	  UN-­‐REDD	  donor	  countries	  will	  not	  be	  held	  accountable	  if	  emissions	  reductions	  are	  not	  actual	  and	  measurable;	  instead	  these	  countries	  can	  “transfer	  the	  risks	  by	  making	  carbon	  payments	  to	  REDD+	  countries	  ex-­‐post	  or	  ‘on-­‐delivery”	  (p.	  3),	  but	  uncertainty	  remains	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  incentives	  will	  lead	  to	  permanent	  changes	  in	  forest	  management	  (UN-­‐REDD,	  2008).	  Most	  developing	  countries	  do	  not	  have	  the	  technical	  ability	  to	  set	  up	  monitoring	  systems	  to	  measure	  carbon	  emissions	  or	  forest	  clearances	  and	  will	  need	  help	  in	  doing	  so	  (UN-­‐REDD,	  2008,	  p.	  4).	  Lastly,	  there	  is	  a	  concern	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  REDD+	  programs	  defines	  ecosystem	  services	  as	  commodities	  through	  the	  use	  of	  payment	  systems,	  which	  can	  deter	  local	  land	  development	  in	  developing	  countries	  and	  undermine	  conservation	  as	  a	  value	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  (UN-­‐REDD,	  2008,	  p.	  4).	  There	  are	  many	  potential	  benefits	  for	  REDD+,	  though,	  such	  as	  biodiversity	  conservation,	  improved	  local	  livelihoods,	  increased	  food	  availability	  and	  access,	  and	  better	  water	  and	  soil	  conditions	  (UN-­‐REDD,	  2008,	  p.	  5).	  	   The	  two	  key	  components	  of	  UN-­‐REDD	  are	  “(i)	  assisting	  developing	  countries	  [to]	  prepare	  and	  implement	  national	  REDD	  strategies	  and	  mechanisms;	  (ii)	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supporting	  the	  development	  of	  normative	  solutions	  and	  standardized	  approaches	  based	  on	  sound	  science	  for	  a	  REDD+	  instrument	  linked	  with	  the	  UNFCCC”	  (p.	  7),	  which	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  empowerment	  of	  developing	  countries	  in	  maintaining	  REDD+	  operations	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  guidance	  to	  aid	  the	  developing	  countries	  technically	  and	  financially	  (UN-­‐REDD,	  2008).	  Key	  inclusions	  in	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  are	  human	  rights	  based	  approaches	  and	  participatory	  involvement	  (UN-­‐REDD,	  2008,	  p.	  7).	  National	  governments	  of	  developing	  countries	  will	  direct	  the	  scope	  of	  REDD+	  under	  their	  Joint	  Programmes	  and	  will	  need	  to	  collaborate	  with	  international	  UN-­‐REDD	  partners	  in	  supporting	  REDD+	  initiatives	  (UN-­‐REDD,	  2008,	  p.	  8).	  Various	  spheres	  of	  support	  that	  may	  be	  offered	  include:	  building	  alliances	  and	  assessing	  individual	  country	  needs	  through	  observation	  of	  each	  country’s	  conditions	  and	  development	  planning,	  measuring	  the	  readiness	  of	  a	  country	  to	  partake	  in	  REDD+,	  assuring	  sincere	  participation	  in	  the	  Programme	  and	  involving	  local	  stakeholders,	  maintaining	  a	  balance	  between	  national	  REDD+	  initiatives	  and	  national	  development	  strategies,	  providing	  financial	  and	  technical	  aid,	  providing	  long-­‐term	  services	  to	  aid	  in	  data	  monitoring,	  and	  the	  structuring	  and	  distributing	  of	  REDD+	  payments	  to	  partner	  countries	  (UN-­‐REDD,	  2008,	  p.	  8-­‐11).	  Involving	  local	  inhabitants	  and	  governments	  are	  crucial	  to	  the	  success	  of	  REDD+;	  According	  to	  Cadman	  and	  Maraseni	  (2012),	  the	  only	  way	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  will	  be	  successful	  is	  if	  local	  inhabitants	  are	  informed	  of	  REDD+	  and	  its	  potential	  costs	  and	  benefits,	  included	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  and	  allowed	  to	  participate	  throughout	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  program	  (p.	  622).	  If	  this	  is	  not	  done,	  local	  communities	  may	  continue	  to	  be	  marginalized	  by	  international	  and	  national	  stakeholders.	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Since	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  is	  run	  by	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  Programme	  must	  adhere	  to	  specific	  guidelines	  regarding	  indigenous	  peoples,	  which	  include	  “a	  rights-­‐based	  approach,	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Group	  Guidelines,	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples”	  (p.	  3)	  and	  thus	  can	  incorporate	  the	  principle	  of	  Free,	  Prior,	  and	  Informed	  Consent	  (FPIC)	  to	  include	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users	  in	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  surrounding	  national	  REDD+	  projects	  (Center	  for	  International	  Environmental	  Law,	  2010).	  The	  Center	  for	  International	  Environmental	  Law	  (2010)	  has	  noted	  that	  the	  FPIC	  principle	  is	  used	  when	  making	  decisions	  surrounding	  “actions	  that	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  impact	  the	  lands,	  territories,	  and	  resources	  upon	  which	  rights	  holders	  depend	  for	  their	  cultural,	  spiritual,	  and	  physical	  sustenance,	  well-­‐being,	  and	  survival”	  (p.	  3),	  such	  as	  proposed	  REDD+	  projects,	  development	  projects,	  and	  other	  proposals	  that	  may	  affect	  indigenous	  peoples’	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users’	  rights	  to	  their	  lands,	  livelihood	  activities,	  and	  natural	  resources.	  This	  principle	  includes	  communicating	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  a	  future	  action	  with	  the	  group(s)	  of	  people	  who	  may	  be	  affected,	  refraining	  from	  discrimination	  in	  meetings,	  respecting	  the	  customary	  institutions	  and	  governance	  in	  place,	  allowing	  for	  democratic	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  to	  be	  held,	  and	  respecting	  the	  right	  of	  those	  who	  may	  be	  affected	  to	  either	  give	  permission	  or	  not	  give	  permission	  to	  a	  future	  activity	  that	  may	  take	  place	  (Tamang,	  2005,	  p.	  3).	  Adherence	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  FPIC	  is	  crucial	  for	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  to	  be	  equitable	  and	  follow	  a	  human	  rights	  based	  approach.	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Ecuador Ecuador	  is	  located	  in	  South	  America	  and	  lies	  on	  the	  equator,	  bordered	  in	  the	  west	  by	  the	  South	  Pacific	  Ocean,	  in	  the	  east	  and	  south	  by	  Peru,	  and	  in	  the	  north	  by	  Colombia	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  528).	  The	  total	  land	  area	  of	  Ecuador	  is	  about	  277,000	  square	  kilometers	  and	  consists	  of	  four	  different	  geographic	  regions,	  which	  include	  the	  “costa”	  or	  coastal	  region,	  the	  “sierra”	  or	  the	  Ecuadorian	  Andes	  region	  (the	  highlands),	  the	  “oriente”	  or	  the	  area	  that	  stretches	  from	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  Andes	  to	  the	  Amazonian	  jungle	  region	  (the	  lowlands),	  and	  the	  Galapagos	  Islands	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook;	  P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  528).	  Politically,	  Ecuador	  is	  separated	  into	  24	  provincial	  districts	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  528).	  According	  to	  the	  CIA’s	  World	  Factbook,	  the	  total	  population	  of	  Ecuador	  amounts	  to	  near	  15	  and	  a	  half	  million,	  in	  which	  the	  most	  prevalent	  ethnic	  groups	  are	  mestizo	  (71.9%),	  Montubio	  (7.4%),	  Afro-­‐Ecuadorian	  (7.2%),	  Amerindian	  (7%),	  white	  (6.1%),	  and	  other	  (0.4%).	  Included	  within	  these	  larger	  ethnic	  groups	  are	  14	  minority	  indigenous	  groups,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  the	  Huaorani,	  Kichwa,	  Cofan,	  Awa,	  Shuar,	  and	  the	  Achuar	  (Minority	  Rights	  Group	  International).	  Oftentimes,	  indigenous	  groups	  are	  identified	  as	  Amazonian	  lowlanders	  or	  Andean	  highlanders,	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  group	  resides	  in	  the	  Amazonian	  basin	  or	  the	  Andean	  highlands	  (MRG	  International).	  The	  Afro-­‐Ecuadorians	  can	  also	  be	  identified	  as	  an	  indigenous	  group	  in	  this	  work	  and	  mostly	  reside	  in	  the	  coastal	  region	  (MRG	  International).	   Ecuador	  gained	  independence	  from	  Spain	  in	  1830.	  Until	  1942,	  the	  country	  fought	  territorial	  battles	  with	  neighboring	  countries.	  The	  1950s	  marked	  a	  time	  of	  social	  unrest	  in	  Ecuador;	  the	  country	  was	  not	  stabilized	  until	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	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due	  to	  military	  rule	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  democratic	  political	  system	  in	  1979	  (MRG	  International).	  Although	  Ecuador	  has	  participated	  in	  a	  democratic	  political	  system	  for	  nearly	  35	  years,	  the	  government	  is	  still	  relatively	  unstable.	  Since	  1997	  alone,	  Ecuador	  has	  been	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  seven	  presidents.	  The	  current	  president	  Rafael	  Correa	  has	  been	  in	  power	  since	  2007	  and	  was	  recently	  re-­‐elected	  in	  2013	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook).	  In	  2008,	  a	  Constituent	  Assembly	  was	  established	  by	  President	  Rafael	  Correa,	  in	  order	  to	  draft	  a	  new	  constitution	  that	  “promised	  to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  neoliberal	  policies	  that	  had	  shifted	  wealth	  from	  marginalized	  peoples	  to	  elite	  corporate	  interests”	  (Becker,	  2011,	  p.	  47). P.	  Reed	  (2011)	  has	  noted	  that	  Ecuador	  is	  “considered	  one	  of	  the	  planet’s	  17	  mega-­‐diverse	  countries	  by	  Conservation	  International	  [and]	  it	  is	  said	  to	  hold	  18%	  of	  the	  world’s	  bird	  species,	  10%	  of	  its	  vascular	  plants,	  8%	  of	  its	  mammal	  species,	  and	  10%	  of	  its	  amphibious	  species”	  (p.	  529),	  which	  shows	  Ecuador’s	  high	  levels	  of	  biodiversity.	  According	  to	  Mosandl,	  Gunter,	  Stimm,	  and	  Weber	  (2008),	  the	  2005	  estimate	  of	  Ecuador’s	  forest	  cover	  was	  approximately	  10.8	  million	  hectares	  of	  varietal	  forest	  types	  covering	  nearly	  39%	  of	  the	  country	  (p.	  38).	  The	  annual	  deforestation	  rate	  is	  estimated	  at	  1.7%,	  which	  is	  the	  highest	  rate	  of	  deforestation	  in	  South	  America	  (Mosandl	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.	  38).	  There	  were	  two	  periods	  of	  intense	  deforestation	  in	  Ecuador;	  the	  first	  took	  place	  in	  the	  highlands	  during	  the	  pre-­‐Columbian	  period	  and	  the	  second	  took	  place	  throughout	  the	  1900s	  in	  the	  coastal	  region	  (Mosandl	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.	  38).	  The	  second	  period	  of	  deforestation	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  various	  booms	  in	  the	  economic	  cycle	  due	  to	  raw	  material	  exports	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  529;	  Mosandl	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.	  38).	  The	  forests	  of	  the	  “costa”	  region	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were	  converted	  into	  agricultural	  cropland	  during	  the	  cocoa	  boom	  (1900-­‐1925)	  and	  the	  banana	  boom	  (1950-­‐1968).	  	  	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  1964	  and	  1972	  agrarian	  reform	  laws	  increased	  the	  rate	  of	  deforestation,	  as	  well,	  because	  the	  once-­‐feudally	  distributed	  forestland	  was	  redistributed	  to	  farmers,	  along	  with	  unclaimed	  forestland	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  529).	  As	  these	  new	  forest	  areas	  were	  opened	  up,	  agricultural	  colonists	  came	  in	  to	  convert	  the	  forestland	  for	  agro-­‐industrial	  usage	  and	  the	  production	  of	  monoculture	  crops,	  such	  as	  cocoa	  and	  bananas	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  529).	  During	  the	  1970s	  oil	  boom,	  vast	  oil	  reserves	  were	  found	  in	  the	  subsoil	  of	  Ecuador’s	  Amazonian	  lowlands	  (the	  “Oriente”	  region);	  this	  region	  was	  opened	  up	  by	  the	  construction	  of	  roads,	  “which	  attracted	  agricultural	  colonization	  and	  timber	  extraction”	  (Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  530).	  These	  key	  periods	  in	  history	  contributed	  to	  a	  forest	  cover	  drop	  from	  63%	  total	  land	  coverage	  in	  1958	  to	  45%	  of	  the	  total	  land	  coverage	  in	  1987	  (Mosandl	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.	  38).	  	  As	  much	  of	  Ecuador’s	  forest	  cover	  has	  been	  removed,	  most	  of	  the	  remaining	  forest	  lies	  in	  the	  “Oriente”	  lowlands	  region,	  which	  is	  still	  generally	  isolated	  from	  transportation	  infrastructure	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  529).	  	  Deforestation	  presents	  a	  major	  challenge	  for	  Ecuador,	  so	  the	  national	  and	  regional	  governments	  have	  taken	  conservative	  efforts	  to	  establish	  protected	  areas,	  which	  now	  account	  for	  roughly	  a	  quarter	  of	  Ecuador’s	  total	  land	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  529).	  It	  is	  apparent	  that	  Ecuador’s	  primary	  source	  of	  economic	  profit	  is	  from	  the	  extraction	  of	  natural	  resources;	  industrialized	  exports	  account	  for	  only	  22%	  of	  the	  country’s	  total	  exports	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  529).	  Ecuador’s	  economy	  is	  reliant	  on	  raw	  materials,	  such	  as	  bananas,	  cocoa,	  coffee,	  shrimp,	  plantains,	  and	  sugarcane,	  along	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with	  oil	  and	  petroleum	  resources,	  which	  account	  for	  greater	  than	  half	  of	  Ecuador’s	  export	  dollars	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook).	  The	  juxtaposition	  of	  two	  competing	  efforts-­‐-­‐	  one	  of	  conservation	  and	  one	  of	  economic	  development-­‐-­‐	  has	  undermined	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  government	  to	  successfully	  protect	  Ecuador’s	  remaining	  forestland	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  529).	  At	  present,	  oil	  extraction	  and	  mining	  activities	  still	  take	  place	  in	  the	  protected	  areas,	  due	  to	  “contradictory	  laws,	  policies,	  and	  lack	  of	  coordination	  between	  different	  government	  ministries	  [which]	  continue	  to	  hamper	  the	  development	  of	  a	  coherent	  national	  conservation	  strategy”	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  529).	   Indigenous	  groups	  in	  Ecuador	  have	  historically	  been	  affected	  by	  high	  poverty	  levels,	  large	  gaps	  in	  income	  inequalities,	  low	  literacy	  rates,	  and	  minimal	  access	  to	  health	  care	  services,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  majority	  mestizo	  population;	  this	  emphasizes	  the	  continuing	  socio-­‐economic	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  majority	  group	  and	  the	  minority	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  the	  oppression	  of	  the	  latter	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook;	  MRG	  International;	  P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  530).	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  indigenous	  movement	  in	  Ecuador,	  the	  1920s	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  indigenous	  activism	  due	  to	  the	  state’s	  discriminating	  policies	  that	  excluded	  indigenous	  groups	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  530).	  This	  activism	  continued	  to	  play	  a	  part	  in	  the	  Ecuadorian	  state,	  most	  notably	  in	  indigenous	  groups’	  position	  as	  key	  proponents	  in	  pressuring	  the	  government	  to	  approve	  the	  agrarian	  reform	  laws	  of	  1964	  and	  1972,	  which	  redistributed	  land	  to	  farmers	  that	  was	  historically	  organized	  in	  a	  feudal	  system	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  530;	  Blankstein,	  1973,	  p.	  74).	  	  A	  key	  group	  known	  as	  the	  Confederation	  of	  the	  Indigenous	  Nations	  of	  Ecuador	  (CONAIE)	  was	  founded	  in	  1986	  and	  seeks	  to	  bring	  power	  back	  to	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indigenous	  groups	  in	  terms	  of	  land	  ownership,	  recognition	  of	  diverse	  indigenous	  identities	  as	  building	  blocks	  to	  a	  national	  culture,	  and	  equal	  rights	  to	  education,	  healthcare,	  other	  social	  services	  (MRG	  International).	  CONAIE,	  as	  well	  as	  “its	  political	  party,	  ‘Pachakutic,’	  and	  the	  larger	  indigenous	  movement”	  (p.	  531)	  has	  been	  involved	  in	  various	  political	  uprisings	  of	  the	  1990s	  in	  Ecuador,	  most	  notably	  in	  fighting	  for	  indigenous	  collective	  rights	  and	  in	  opposition	  to	  various	  presidents	  that	  have	  since	  been	  ousted	  (Reed,	  2011).	  CONAIE	  and	  the	  greater	  indigenous	  movement	  unified	  indigenous	  groups	  under	  an	  overlying	  tribal	  classification,	  in	  which	  each	  group	  may	  maintain	  a	  distinct	  cultural	  identity	  under	  an	  overall	  umbrella	  identification	  as	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  politics	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  531).	  
 
Indonesia 	   Indonesia	  is	  an	  archipelago	  located	  in	  between	  the	  Pacific	  Ocean	  and	  Indian	  Ocean	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  has	  a	  tropical	  climate	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook).	  According	  to	  the	  CIA	  World	  Factbook,	  the	  total	  land	  area	  of	  Indonesia	  is	  close	  to	  1,811,569	  square	  kilometers	  and	  is	  made	  up	  of	  17,508	  islands,	  6,000	  of	  which	  are	  inhabited.	  Indonesia	  consists	  of	  31	  provinces,	  1	  autonomous	  province,	  1	  special	  region,	  and	  1	  national	  capital	  district.	  The	  total	  population	  of	  Indonesia	  is	  estimated	  close	  to	  251,160,124,	  where	  the	  most	  prevalent	  ethnic	  groups	  are	  Javanese	  (40.6%),	  Sudanese	  (15%),	  Madurese	  (3.3%),	  Minangkabau	  (2.7%),	  Betawi	  (2.4%),	  Bugis	  (2.4%),	  Banten	  (2%),	  Banjar	  (1.7%),	  and	  other	  (29.9%)	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook).	  There	  are	  an	  estimated	  30	  to	  40	  million	  Indonesian	  inhabitants	  that	  are	  considered	  indigenous	  peoples	  (IWGIA).	  Some	  indigenous	  groups	  in	  Indonesia	  include	  the	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Acehnese,	  the	  Papuans,	  the	  Dayaks,	  and	  the	  Bajau	  among	  others	  (MRG	  International).	   	   Indonesia	  was	  colonized	  by	  the	  Dutch	  in	  the	  1800s,	  after	  the	  dissolution	  of	  Dutch	  East	  India	  Company,	  which	  was	  established	  in	  the	  early	  1600s	  (MRG	  International).	  The	  Dutch	  colonization	  period	  ended	  near	  the	  start	  of	  the	  World	  War	  II,	  when	  Japan	  invaded	  Indonesia.	  Indonesia	  declared	  independence	  four	  years	  later,	  but,	  after	  Japan	  was	  defeated	  in	  WWII,	  the	  Dutch	  attempted	  to	  colonize	  Indonesia	  once	  again	  (MRG	  International).	  The	  Indonesians	  fought	  a	  “four-­‐year	  war	  of	  independence	  [and]	  the	  Netherlands	  finally	  recognized	  Indonesian	  independence	  in	  1949”	  (MRG	  International).	  During	  the	  period	  of	  Dutch	  colonial	  rule,	  the	  Chinese	  were	  urged	  to	  migrate	  to	  Indonesia,	  in	  order	  to	  mediate	  between	  native	  Indonesians	  and	  Dutch	  rulers	  (MRG	  International).	  Today,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  Chinese	  presence	  in	  Indonesia.	  The	  island	  of	  East	  Timor	  was	  controlled	  by	  the	  Portuguese	  until	  1975,	  when	  it	  was	  invaded	  by	  Indonesia	  (MRG	  International).	  After	  Indonesia	  became	  independent	  in	  1949,	  the	  country	  has	  suffered	  turmoil	  due	  to	  diverse	  ethnic	  identities,	  the	  large	  size	  of	  the	  archipelago,	  the	  absence	  of	  political	  unity,	  and	  poverty-­‐ridden	  minority	  and	  indigenous	  groups	  (MRG	  International).	  	  According	  to	  MRG	  International,	  the	  first	  president	  of	  Indonesia,	  Sukarno,	  facilitated	  the	  resurfacing	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Indonesia	  (PKI),	  in	  order	  to	  “counterbalance	  the	  political	  strength	  of	  the	  army	  and	  the	  militant	  Islamic	  political	  parties	  in	  the	  1950s.”	  The	  PKI	  and	  leftist	  extremists	  attempted	  to	  seize	  control	  of	  power	  in	  1965,	  but	  were	  quelled	  by	  General	  Suharto’s	  army	  (MRG	  International).	  Nearly	  500,000	  PKI	  members	  and	  supporters,	  including	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Chinese	  
23	  
immigrants,	  were	  massacred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  failed	  coup	  d’état;	  Suharto	  became	  the	  new	  president	  of	  Indonesia	  and	  ruled	  until	  1998	  (MRG	  International).	  During	  Suharto’s	  rule,	  the	  military	  held	  a	  strong	  position	  in	  politics	  and	  were	  given	  civic	  advantages	  (MRG	  International).	  Suharto	  was	  ousted	  after	  riots	  and	  protests	  denouncing	  his	  regime.	  In	  2004,	  Indonesia	  held	  the	  country’s	  “first	  direct	  presidential	  election”	  and	  had	  goals	  of	  lessening	  the	  political	  power	  of	  the	  military,	  but	  not	  to	  completely	  end	  this	  power	  (MRG	  International).	  This	  election	  signified	  Indonesia’s	  movement	  toward	  democracy.	  The	  protection	  of	  various	  human	  rights	  was	  added	  into	  the	  constitution,	  which	  has	  not	  done	  much	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  rights	  abuses,	  many	  of	  which	  have	  been	  directed	  towards	  minority	  populations	  (MRG	  International).	  As	  Indonesia	  is	  predominantly	  Muslim	  (86.1%),	  there	  have	  been	  attempts	  to	  establish	  Indonesia	  as	  an	  Islamic	  state	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook;	  MRG	  International).	   	   According	  to	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme,	  nearly	  60%	  of	  Indonesia’s	  land	  area	  is	  forested,	  “which	  makes	  it	  the	  third	  largest	  area	  of	  tropical	  rainforest	  in	  the	  world…	  and	  cover[s]	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  planet’s	  tropical	  deep	  peat.”	  Nearly	  1.17	  million	  hectares	  of	  forestland	  was	  deteriorated	  or	  cleared	  annually	  during	  a	  three-­‐year	  period	  in	  the	  mid-­‐2000s.	  Dauvergne	  (1993-­‐1994)	  argued	  that	  the	  four	  primary	  sources	  of	  deforestation	  are	  large-­‐scale	  swidden	  agriculture,	  a	  devastating	  logging	  industry,	  extensive	  development	  plans,	  as	  well	  as	  governmental	  policies	  promoting	  forest	  exploitation	  (p.	  503).	  Swidden	  farming	  is	  a	  practice,	  in	  which	  “annual	  crops	  are	  planted	  on	  a	  given	  piece	  of	  land	  only	  for	  one	  or	  two	  years	  at	  a	  time,	  whereafter	  the	  farmer	  moves	  on	  to	  a	  new	  plot	  and	  tree	  cover	  is	  allowed	  to	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regenerate	  on	  the	  (temporarily)	  abandoned	  land”	  (Henley,	  2008,	  p.	  276).	  Dauvergne	  (1993-­‐1994)	  defended	  the	  position	  that	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  claim	  that	  poverty	  causes	  the	  practice	  of	  indigenous	  swidden	  farming	  is	  unjustified	  (p.	  510).	  Although	  the	  ruling	  elite	  believes	  swidden	  agriculture	  practiced	  by	  indigenous	  groups	  in	  the	  outer	  islands	  is	  detrimental	  to	  the	  forest	  and	  inefficient,	  it	  is	  sustainable	  if	  population	  numbers	  remain	  low	  and	  it	  is	  done	  on	  a	  small	  scale	  (Dauvergne,	  1993-­‐1994,	  p.	  510).	  Moreover,	  large-­‐scale	  swidden	  agriculture	  that	  does	  not	  follow	  traditional	  practices	  and,	  instead,	  favors	  the	  production	  of	  “cash	  crops”	  (p.	  510-­‐511)	  leads	  to	  deforestation	  due	  to	  overworking	  the	  land	  (Dauvergne,	  1993-­‐1994).	   According	  to	  Dauvergne	  (1993-­‐1994),	  deforestation	  is	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  extensive	  logging	  operations	  in	  Indonesia,	  which	  heavily	  increased	  due	  to	  the	  1967	  Foreign	  Capital	  Investment	  Law	  (p.	  513).	  This	  law	  promotes	  timber	  extraction	  by	  multinational	  corporations	  in	  Indonesia’s	  outer	  islands	  (Dauvergne,	  1993-­‐1994,	  p.	  513).	  Indonesia	  is	  the	  main	  supplier	  of	  plywood	  in	  the	  world	  and	  accounts	  for	  nearly	  70%	  of	  world	  exports	  in	  plywood	  trade	  due	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  Apkindo,	  which	  is	  an	  association	  joining	  all	  plywood	  mills	  in	  Indonesia,	  and,	  effectively	  monopolizes	  the	  world	  plywood	  trade	  (Dauvergne,	  1993-­‐1994,	  p.	  513).	  Oftentimes,	  logging	  operations	  and	  plywood	  production	  in	  Indonesia	  are	  relatively	  inefficient	  and	  produce	  high	  rates	  of	  deforestation.	  Indonesia’s	  primary	  exports	  are	  found	  on	  the	  outer	  islands	  and	  include	  wood,	  oil,	  plantation	  crops,	  and	  tin	  (Dauvergne,	  1993-­‐1994,	  p.	  505).	  Extensive	  development	  projects	  in	  Indonesia	  include	  the	  “central	  government’s	  transmigration	  projects	  which	  moved	  an	  estimated	  3,600,000	  people	  from	  Java	  to	  the	  outer	  islands	  by	  1987”	  (p.	  511),	  further	  stressing	  the	  resources	  of	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the	  outer	  islands	  due	  to	  increasing	  population	  pressure	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  “cash	  crop”	  agricultural	  practices	  (Dauvergne,	  1993-­‐1994).	  	  Deforestation	  continues	  to	  occur	  because	  of	  the	  government’s	  encouragement	  of	  “cash	  crop”	  practices	  leading	  to	  the	  clearing	  of	  forests	  and	  the	  increased	  application	  of	  swidden	  farming	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  success	  from	  the	  government’s	  wet-­‐rice	  farms	  in	  providing	  food	  security	  to	  the	  people	  of	  the	  outer	  islands	  (Dauvergne,	  1993-­‐1994,	  p.	  511).	  Lastly,	  Indonesian	  governmental	  policies	  promote	  deforestation	  through	  the	  “selective	  cutting	  policy,	  and	  the	  reforestation	  fund	  policy”	  (Dauvergne,	  1993-­‐1994,	  p.	  515),	  which	  disincentivize	  sustainable	  management	  of	  forests	  and	  use	  a	  top-­‐down	  approach	  to	  management-­‐-­‐	  an	  approach	  that	  does	  not	  recognize	  the	  differences	  between	  various	  forest	  types	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  undercuts	  indigenous	  groups’	  local	  management	  of	  the	  forests	  (Affif	  &	  Lowe,	  2007,	  p.	  80). Dauvergne	  (1993-­‐1994)	  also	  argued	  that	  western	  thinking	  promotes	  development	  through	  the	  concept	  of	  industrialization	  and	  that	  the	  ruling	  elite	  of	  Indonesia	  strives	  to	  follow	  this	  path	  to	  modernization	  and	  prosperity,	  with	  deforestation	  largely	  being	  the	  result	  of	  this	  mindset	  (p.	  506).	  	  To	  the	  ruling	  elite,	  the	  forests	  are	  seen	  as	  a	  crucial,	  but	  dispensable,	  resource	  to	  increase	  economic	  profit	  and	  pave	  the	  way	  to	  industrialization	  (Dauvergne,	  1993-­‐1994,	  p.	  507).	  The	  outcomes	  of	  deforestation	  are	  exhibited	  in	  the	  depletion	  of	  soil	  fertility	  and	  soil	  erosion,	  the	  increasing	  risk	  of	  floods,	  and	  intense	  droughts,	  all	  of	  which	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  greater	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  (Dauvergne,	  1993-­‐1994,	  p.	  508).	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   Indigenous	  groups	  in	  Indonesia	  have	  long	  fought	  for	  customary	  land	  rights	  and	  environmental	  protection.	  The	  framework	  “masyarakat	  adat”	  refers	  to	  Indonesian	  communities	  who	  follow	  the	  practice	  of	  traditional	  law	  and,	  through	  this	  framework,	  become	  legitimate	  groups	  with	  land	  rights	  who	  should	  be	  protected	  from	  state	  control	  of	  resources	  and	  natural	  resource	  exploitation	  by	  outsiders	  (Afiff	  &	  Lowe,	  2007,	  p.	  81).	  The	  term	  “ulayat”	  refers	  to	  traditional	  land	  rights	  practiced	  by	  indigenous	  groups	  (Wright,	  2011,	  p.	  126).	  Prior	  to	  Indonesian	  independence,	  there	  was	  a	  dualistic	  system	  in	  place	  that	  reflected	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  Dutch	  colonialists,	  as	  well	  as	  traditional	  governing	  systems	  of	  indigenous	  groups	  in	  Indonesia,	  or	  “adat”	  systems	  (Wright,	  2011,	  p.	  125).	  Following	  with	  Sukarno’s	  rule,	  the	  notion	  of	  “adat”	  was	  not	  recognized	  in	  the	  class-­‐based	  struggle	  for	  nationalism	  under	  the	  PKI,	  although	  peasant	  farmers	  were	  encouraged	  to	  unite	  to	  fight	  against	  landowners	  and	  reclaim	  rights	  over	  their	  lands	  that	  were	  previously	  owned	  by	  the	  Dutch.	  	  The	  passing	  of	  the	  Basic	  Agrarian	  Law	  in	  1960	  gave	  the	  central	  government	  control	  of	  the	  lands,	  removing	  “ulayat”	  rights	  (Wright,	  2011,	  p.	  126).	  Under	  Suharto’s	  rule,	  the	  authoritarian	  context	  of	  the	  government	  allowed	  for	  the	  state	  to	  control	  Indonesia’s	  forested	  land	  and	  precious	  natural	  resources	  and	  took	  away	  local	  indigenous	  management	  of	  the	  lands	  (Wright,	  2011,	  p.	  82).	  The	  1967	  Forestry	  Act	  implemented	  under	  Suharto	  (and	  the	  latter	  New	  Forestry	  Act	  of	  1999)	  further	  trivializes	  indigenous	  groups;	  land	  can	  only	  be	  owned	  by	  the	  state	  or	  proprietors,	  such	  as	  logging	  companies	  and	  large	  multinational	  corporations	  (Wright,	  2011,	  p.	  126).	  Wright	  has	  mentioned	  that	  “the	  New	  Forestry	  Act	  confirms	  that	  forests	  formerly	  controlled	  by	  adat	  law	  communities	  are	  included	  in	  the	  ‘State	  Forest’	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category.	  This	  means	  that	  adat	  communities	  do	  not	  own	  or	  control	  the	  forests	  in	  which	  they	  live”	  (p.	  126-­‐127).	  Within	  the	  New	  Forestry	  Act,	  the	  state	  is	  given	  power	  to	  categorize	  forests	  as	  productive,	  protected,	  or	  conserved,	  which	  includes	  lands	  under	  adat	  systems	  (as	  these	  are	  controlled	  by	  the	  state)	  (Wright,	  2011,	  p.	  127).	  	  After	  Suharto’s	  removal	  from	  power	  in	  1998,	  a	  1999	  meeting	  surrounding	  the	  framework	  of	  “masyarakat	  adat”	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  “Alliance	  of	  Masyarakat	  Adat	  of	  the	  Archipelago,	  also	  known	  as	  AMAN”	  (Afiff	  and	  Lowe,	  207,	  p.	  84).	  AMAN	  denounced	  state	  control	  of	  “adat”	  lands	  and	  fought	  for	  customary	  land	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  communities	  (Wright,	  2011,	  p.	  84).	  Since	  this	  time,	  indigenous	  groups	  in	  Indonesia	  are	  still	  fighting	  for	  land	  rights	  and	  against	  large	  corporate	  activities	  that	  are	  destroying	  the	  forests	  (MRG	  International).	  There	  are	  still	  strained	  relations	  between	  the	  indigenous	  groups	  inhabiting	  the	  Outer	  Islands	  and	  the	  ruling	  elite	  in	  Java,	  exemplifying	  indigenous	  groups’	  continuing	  struggle	  for	  recognition	  and	  equality	  in	  the	  Indonesian	  forestry	  sector	  (MRG	  International).	  	  
 
Tanzania The	  United	  Republic	  of	  Tanzania,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  Tanzania,	  is	  located	  on	  the	  eastern	  coast	  of	  Africa,	  bordered	  by	  Uganda	  and	  Kenya	  in	  the	  north,	  Mozambique,	  Malawi,	  and	  Zambia	  in	  the	  south,	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,	  Rwanda,	  and	  Burundi	  in	  the	  west,	  and	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  in	  the	  east	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook).	  According	  to	  the	  CIA	  World	  Factbook,	  Tanzania	  has	  a	  total	  land	  area	  of	  885,800	  square	  kilometers.	  The	  islands	  of	  Zanzibar,	  Pemba,	  and	  Mafia	  are	  part	  of	  Tanzania,	  as	  well,	  although	  Zanzibar	  is	  a	  semi-­‐autonomous	  region	  (CIA	  World	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Factbook).	  There	  are	  30	  administrative	  regions	  in	  Tanzania,	  including	  five	  on	  Zanzibar	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook).	  The	  population	  of	  Tanzania	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  close	  to	  48,261,940,	  in	  which	  there	  are	  over	  120	  ethnic	  groups	  (UPenn).	  Most	  Tanzanians	  speak	  Bantu	  languages,	  while	  a	  much	  smaller	  number	  of	  people	  speak	  Nilotic	  languages.	  This	  is	  the	  major	  ethnic	  division	  in	  Tanzania,	  while	  there	  is	  also	  a	  religious	  division	  between	  Christians	  and	  Muslims.	  A	  few	  minority	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  Hadza,	  remain	  isolated	  and	  maintain	  their	  own	  language.	   The	  mainland	  of	  Tanzania,	  Tanganyika,	  claimed	  independence	  from	  British	  rule	  in	  1961;	  Zanzibar	  was	  a	  sultanate	  until	  1963	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook).	  Both	  regions	  joined	  to	  form	  the	  United	  Republic	  of	  Tanzania	  in	  1964	  under	  a	  one-­‐party	  system	  with	  separate	  administration	  units	  per	  each	  region,	  with	  the	  first	  president	  of	  Tanzania	  being	  Julius	  Nyerere	  and	  Zanzibar	  remaining	  semi-­‐autonomous	  (MRG	  International).	  In	  1977,	  Tanganyika	  and	  Zanzibar	  merged	  under	  one	  ruling	  party,	  known	  as	  the	  “Chama	  Cha	  Mapinduzi	  (CCM)	  party”	  and	  created	  a	  new	  constitution,	  although	  “the	  dual	  administration	  was	  largely	  retained”	  (MRG	  International).	  Nyerere	  put	  into	  effect	  a	  policy	  called	  “Villagization”	  in	  1974,	  which	  had	  socialist	  ideals	  to	  create	  common	  property	  villages	  known	  as	  ujamaas	  (MRG	  International).	  This	  policy	  effectually	  harmed	  the	  rural	  poor	  and	  extended	  political	  control	  throughout	  Tanzania	  by	  the	  use	  of	  force	  and	  coercion,	  leaving	  feelings	  of	  resentment	  towards	  the	  government	  (MRG	  International).	  The	  1980s	  marked	  a	  time	  in	  which	  Tanzania’s	  economy	  completely	  collapsed	  due	  to	  socialist	  economic	  practices,	  like	  price	  controls	  and	  a	  reduction	  of	  exports;	  this	  led	  to	  the	  need	  for	  foreign	  aid	  and	  an	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increasing	  reliance	  on	  foreign	  donors	  and	  international	  organizations	  (Rydenfelt,	  1986).	  	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  Tanzania’s	  economy	  increasingly	  moved	  toward	  liberalization	  with	  help	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF),	  which	  further	  exacerbated	  growing	  inequality	  between	  the	  wealthy	  and	  the	  peasantry	  (MRG	  International;	  CIA	  World	  Factbook).	  Ali	  Hassan	  Mwinyi	  was	  given	  presidential	  power	  in	  1985,	  while	  Nyerere	  retained	  political	  control	  as	  the	  head	  of	  the	  CCM	  party	  for	  five	  more	  years	  (MRG	  International).	  Tanzania’s	  constitution	  was	  amended	  in	  1992	  to	  allow	  for	  multi-­‐party	  elections,	  though	  the	  CCM	  continues	  to	  hold	  a	  monopoly	  on	  political	  power	  (MRG	  International).	  The	  following	  presidents,	  Benjamin	  Mkapa	  and	  Jakaya	  Kikwete,	  have	  continuingly	  liberalized	  the	  economy,	  but	  Tanzanian	  citizens	  remain	  extremely	  impoverished	  (MRG	  International).	   The	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  has	  noted	  that	  about	  40%	  of	  Tanzania	  is	  forested	  (UN-­‐REDD).	  Barraclough	  and	  Ghimire	  (1996)	  have	  stated	  “almost	  98	  per	  cent	  of	  this	  forest	  is	  miombo	  woodlands	  which	  cover	  most	  of	  the	  western	  and	  southern	  part	  of	  the	  country	  and	  range	  from	  rather	  dense	  closed	  forest	  to	  open	  woods	  in	  drier	  regions,	  blending	  into	  bushlands	  and	  grasslands.”	  There	  is	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  tropical	  forest	  and	  mangrove	  forests,	  which	  contain	  high	  levels	  of	  biodiversity.	  Deforestation	  in	  Tanzania	  is	  increasing	  due	  to	  population	  pressures	  and	  low	  land	  productivity	  at	  an	  estimated	  rate	  of	  2%	  decrease	  in	  forest	  cover	  yearly	  (Ossrea,	  1999,	  p.	  17).	  	  Nearly	  80%	  of	  Tanzanians	  are	  rural	  inhabitants,	  who	  are	  nomadic	  pastoralists,	  agropastoralists,	  or	  peasants	  (Mgeni,	  1992,	  p.	  426).	  Agriculture	  makes	  up	  nearly	  25%	  of	  Tanzania’s	  GDP	  and	  accounts	  for	  more	  than	  80%	  of	  Tanzania’s	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export	  dollars;	  the	  main	  agricultural	  products	  serve	  as	  “cash	  crops”	  and	  include	  coffee,	  tobacco,	  cashew	  nuts,	  cloves,	  and	  fruits,	  among	  others	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook;	  Mgeni,	  1992,	  p.	  426).	  	  The	  largest	  industries	  in	  Tanzania	  are	  the	  refinement	  of	  agricultural	  goods,	  the	  gold,	  diamond,	  and	  nickel	  mining,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  production	  of	  wood	  commodities	  and	  commercial	  logging	  (CIA	  World	  Factbook).	  Ossrea	  (1999)	  noted	  that	  clearing	  land	  for	  agriculture,	  a	  growing	  need	  for	  fuelwood	  in	  urban	  areas,	  charcoal	  production,	  commercial	  logging,	  and	  mining	  are	  the	  main	  causes	  of	  deforestation	  in	  Tanzania	  (p.	  15-­‐16).	  As	  the	  Tanzanian	  economy	  is	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  cash	  crops	  for	  export	  dollars,	  clearing	  land	  for	  agriculture	  through	  “the	  practice	  of	  slash	  and	  burn	  cultivation…	  and	  permanent	  cultivation”	  has	  proved	  vital,	  but	  effectually	  leads	  to	  high	  rates	  of	  deforestation	  (Ossrea,	  1999,	  p.	  15).	  Increases	  in	  population	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  energy	  alternatives,	  especially	  in	  urban	  areas,	  have	  led	  to	  a	  growing	  need	  for	  fuelwood	  and	  charcoal	  to	  meet	  energy	  needs	  (Ossrea,	  1999,	  p.	  15).	  Lastly,	  gold	  mining	  in	  a	  few	  regions	  in	  Tanzania	  has	  led	  to	  “tree	  felling	  and	  land	  stripping	  in	  preparation	  for	  mining”	  (p.	  18),	  causing	  extensive	  deforestation	  in	  these	  areas	  (Ossrea,	  1999).	   In	  Tanzania,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  groups	  of	  traditional	  forest	  peoples	  who	  rely	  on	  the	  forest	  and	  its	  resources	  for	  subsistence.	  Two	  of	  these	  groups	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  hunter-­‐gatherers:	  the	  Hadza	  and	  the	  Ndorobo	  (Hodgson,	  2002,	  p.	  1087).	  The	  Hadza	  peoples,	  who	  live	  near	  Lake	  Eyasi	  on	  the	  outskirts	  of	  the	  Serengeti	  plains,	  are	  believed	  to	  be	  “one	  of	  the	  ‘oldest’	  lineages	  of	  mankind”	  (Survival	  International,	  p.	  1)	  and	  rely	  on	  hunting	  animals,	  collecting	  berries,	  fruits,	  tubers,	  and	  honey	  (Finkel,	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2009,	  p.	  5).	  It	  is	  noted	  that	  the	  Hadza	  have	  left	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  lands	  where	  they	  partake	  in	  subsistence	  activities,	  but	  have	  been	  displaced	  from	  nearly	  90%	  of	  these	  traditional	  lands	  due	  to	  pressures	  from	  herders,	  farmers,	  poachers,	  and	  others	  (Finkel,	  2009,	  p.	  8).	  This	  group	  has	  been	  marginalized	  in	  society	  and	  has	  had	  much	  of	  their	  traditional	  land	  taken.	  As	  the	  Hadza	  continually	  are	  pushed	  off	  their	  land,	  there	  are	  few	  places	  left	  for	  the	  Hadza	  to	  go	  and	  little	  resources	  for	  these	  people	  to	  participate	  in	  their	  traditional	  ways	  of	  hunting	  and	  gathering	  to	  sustain	  their	  livelihoods.	  The	  government	  of	  Tanzania	  views	  the	  Hadza	  as	  primitive	  peoples	  and	  has	  been	  seeking	  to	  conform	  the	  group	  to	  modernity	  by	  promoting	  relocation,	  schooling,	  and	  jobs	  (Finkel,	  2009,	  p.	  9).	  In	  2011,	  land	  titles	  were	  given	  to	  a	  Hadza	  community,	  which	  was	  “the	  first	  time	  a	  Tanzanian	  government	  had	  formally	  recognized	  a	  minority	  tribe’s	  land	  rights”	  (p.	  4),	  which	  was	  a	  success	  for	  the	  Hadza	  people	  because	  the	  government	  recognized	  the	  group’s	  rights	  to	  hold	  land	  tenure	  over	  land	  that	  may	  appear	  unused	  (Survival	  International).	  Another	  group	  of	  hunter-­‐gatherers,	  the	  Ndorobo,	  partake	  in	  activities	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  the	  Hadza,	  such	  as	  foraging	  and	  hunting.	  Specifically,	  one	  group	  of	  Ndorobo	  living	  near	  the	  Napilikinya	  Hills	  is	  also	  losing	  resources	  crucial	  to	  their	  traditional	  lifestyle	  due	  to	  the	  encroachment	  of	  hunters	  and	  farmers	  onto	  their	  land.	  Due	  to	  this	  encroachment,	  the	  Ndorobo	  are	  facing	  severe	  food	  scarcity	  and	  potential	  extinction	  of	  this	  sector	  of	  people	  living	  near	  the	  hills	  (Arusha	  Times).	  	  	   The	  forest-­‐dwelling	  people	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Usambaras,	  located	  in	  Northeastern	  Tanzania,	  rely	  on	  the	  forest	  for	  subsistence	  materials,	  such	  as	  fuelwood,	  construction	  materials,	  and	  various	  non-­‐timber	  products	  (Sylvander,	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2010,	  p.	  5).	  The	  people	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Usambaras	  have	  managed	  their	  lands	  conservatively	  for	  many	  years	  and	  have	  not	  received	  any	  compensation	  for	  doing	  this.	  While	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  advantages	  that	  forests	  generate,	  the	  traditional	  forest	  users	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Usambaras	  are	  unaware	  of	  the	  benefits	  produced	  by	  forests	  on	  national,	  international,	  and	  atmospheric	  scales	  (Sylvander,	  2010,	  p.	  9).	  These	  people	  are	  increasingly	  becoming	  dependent	  on	  agriculture	  as	  a	  means	  to	  grow	  food	  and	  generate	  income	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  collected	  forest	  products.	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  an	  increasing	  stress	  on	  the	  forests	  in	  this	  region	  due	  to	  the	  clearing	  of	  trees	  for	  agricultural	  areas.	  As	  these	  people	  are	  generally	  aware	  of	  the	  benefits	  derived	  from	  the	  forest,	  the	  people	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Usambaras	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  traditional	  forest	  peoples,	  or	  peoples	  who	  are	  reliant	  on	  forest	  products	  for	  livelihood	  activities.	  Some	  of	  these	  people	  may	  use	  agriculture	  as	  a	  means	  to	  grow	  certain	  crops	  and	  generate	  extra	  income.	  These	  people	  heavily	  rely	  on	  forest	  products	  for	  subsistence	  activities,	  but	  may	  also	  use	  forest	  products	  as	  a	  safeguard	  if	  agricultural	  crops	  fail	  or	  for	  extra	  income.	  
 
Methods 	   To	  thoroughly	  examine	  this	  topic,	  preliminary	  data	  were	  collected	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  term	  indigenous	  is	  identified	  in	  modern	  society.	  Traditional	  ways	  of	  land	  management	  that	  are	  practiced	  by	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  forest	  users	  were	  investigated,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  problem	  of	  land	  ownership	  surrounding	  many	  indigenous	  communities.	  The	  causes	  of	  climate	  change,	  specifically	  the	  effects	  of	  deforestation	  on	  releasing	  carbon	  dioxide	  emissions,	  were	  also	  explored.	  Data	  on	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the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  was	  gathered	  to	  understand	  the	  framework,	  costs,	  and	  benefits	  of	  the	  Programme.	  This	  was	  done	  through	  the	  analysis	  of	  academic	  literature	  reviews	  and	  the	  close	  examination	  of	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  and	  the	  UNFCCC	  frameworks.	  Background	  data	  was	  collected	  on	  the	  three	  countries	  used	  in	  the	  case	  study	  analysis,	  which	  are	  Ecuador,	  Indonesia,	  and	  Tanzania.	  The	  background	  data	  collected	  included	  geographical	  facts,	  population	  numbers,	  government	  history,	  forest	  facts,	  causes	  of	  deforestation,	  natural	  resource	  extraction,	  primary	  exports,	  and	  the	  history	  and	  the	  current	  position	  of	  indigenous	  groups	  residing	  in	  these	  three	  countries.	  This	  was	  done	  by	  examining	  the	  CIA	  World	  Factbook,	  the	  Minority	  Rights	  Group	  International	  website,	  and	  various	  academic	  literature	  reviews.	  For	  each	  case	  study,	  data	  was	  collected	  for	  both	  cases	  of	  natural	  resource	  extraction	  and	  REDD+	  pilot	  programs	  in	  each	  country	  to	  evaluate	  potential	  implications	  of	  national	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme.	  	   
Case	  Studies 	   I	  am	  going	  to	  introduce	  case	  studies	  of	  three	  countries	  to	  analyze	  the	  potential	  effects	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  could	  have	  on	  indigenous	  and	  local	  peoples.	  The	  three	  countries	  I	  will	  talk	  about	  are	  Ecuador,	  Indonesia,	  and	  Tanzania.	  
 
Ecuador Ecuador	  signed	  onto	  the	  UN’s	  REDD	  Programme	  in	  October	  2009	  as	  an	  “observer”	  country,	  or	  a	  country	  which	  is	  allowed	  to	  partake	  in	  UN-­‐REDD	  meetings	  by	  networking	  and	  building	  knowledge	  about	  REDD+	  mechanisms	  (UN	  Ecuador,	  p.	  40).	  As	  of	  July	  2012,	  the	  country	  became	  an	  actual	  participant	  in	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	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Programme,	  in	  order	  to	  put	  a	  national	  REDD+	  program	  into	  effect	  (UN-­‐REDD	  Newsletter	  31).	  The	  UN’s	  National	  Programme	  Document-­‐	  Ecuador	  (2011)	  mentions	  that,	  by	  2014,	  all	  stakeholders	  and	  institutions	  involved	  in	  the	  program	  will	  have	  the	  necessary	  skills	  required	  to	  “exercise	  their	  right	  to	  a	  safe	  and	  healthy	  environment,	  environmental	  sustainability,	  including	  biodiversity	  conservation,	  integrated	  natural	  resource	  management,	  environmental	  management”	  (p.	  2)	  and,	  thus,	  can	  implement	  REDD+	  mechanisms	  (UN	  Ecuador).	  As	  this	  program	  has	  just	  recently	  reached	  the	  stage	  of	  actual	  implementation,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  predict	  the	  outcomes	  the	  National	  REDD+	  Program	  in	  Ecuador	  will	  have	  on	  all	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  involved,	  including	  indigenous	  communities.	  Therefore,	  I	  will	  mention	  a	  few	  circumstances	  in	  Ecuador’s	  past	  that	  may	  serve	  as	  parallels	  to	  the	  National	  REDD+	  Program’s,	  thus	  the	  national	  government	  of	  Ecuador’s,	  possible	  effect	  on	  indigenous	  communities	  and	  local	  management	  of	  forest	  resources. Instances	  in	  which	  the	  government	  of	  Ecuador	  has	  faltered	  at	  upholding	  the	  interests	  of	  indigenous	  communities,	  in	  regards	  to	  land	  management,	  is	  relevant	  in	  certain	  cases	  of	  natural	  resource	  extraction,	  most	  notably	  in	  the	  Texaco	  (now	  Chevron)	  case.	  Texaco	  began	  to	  extract	  oil	  resources	  from	  the	  Ecuadorian	  Amazon	  in	  1967,	  an	  activity	  that	  continued	  until	  1992,	  when	  the	  company’s	  operations	  were	  sold	  to	  Petroecuador,	  the	  state	  oil	  company	  of	  Ecuador	  (Kimerling,	  2006,	  p.	  447).	  When	  Texaco	  first	  discovered	  oil	  resources	  in	  the	  Ecuadorian	  Amazon,	  bananas	  no	  longer	  dominated	  the	  economy	  of	  Ecuador—petroleum	  did	  (and	  continues	  to	  do	  so)	  (Kimerling,	  2006,	  p.	  447).	  The	  Government	  of	  Ecuador	  claims	  to	  own	  all	  of	  the	  country’s	  oil	  reserves	  and	  created	  a	  state-­‐run	  company	  called	  Petroecuador	  to	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maintain	  dominance	  over	  these	  oil	  resources	  by	  seeking	  investments	  and	  developing	  petroleum	  infrastructure	  (Kimerling,	  2006,	  p.	  447).	  International	  politics	  came	  into	  play	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time	  and	  exerted	  pressure	  on	  the	  Ecuadorian	  government	  to	  increase	  the	  development	  of	  oil	  fields,	  thus	  profitability,	  which	  led	  to	  Ecuador’s	  dependence	  on	  “foreign	  export	  markets	  and	  foreign	  investment,	  technology,	  and	  expertise”	  (p.	  448),	  leaving	  the	  country	  with	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  foreign	  debt	  (Kimerling,	  2006).	  The	  advantages	  gained	  from	  the	  oil	  industry	  have	  benefited	  the	  few	  elite,	  while	  the	  poverty	  rate	  in	  Ecuador	  remains	  staggeringly	  high	  (Kimerling,	  2006,	  p.	  448). The	  Ecuadorian	  government	  encouraged	  Amazonian	  colonization	  by	  outsiders	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  by	  giving	  out	  land	  titles	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  deforestation	  of	  the	  area	  and	  the	  plantation	  of	  crops	  (Kimerling,	  2006,	  p.	  449).	  Also	  in	  this	  effort,	  the	  government	  wanted	  to	  “’civilize’	  indigenous	  Amazonian	  peoples”	  (p.	  449)	  and	  connect	  the	  groups	  to	  outside	  society.	  In	  1990,	  indigenous	  rights	  to	  land	  were	  formally	  recognized	  by	  the	  government,	  although	  decades	  of	  petroleum	  exploitation	  and	  colonization	  by	  outsiders	  had	  already	  removed	  many	  traditional	  peoples	  from	  their	  land	  (Kimerling,	  2006).	  Indigenous	  groups	  now	  hold	  land	  tenure,	  but	  the	  government	  still	  claims	  ownership	  of	  subsurface	  oil	  and	  minerals	  below	  these	  lands	  (Kimerling,	  2006,	  p.	  450). Also	  in	  1990,	  it	  was	  made	  apparent	  to	  the	  Ecuadorian	  government	  that	  Texaco	  was	  using	  environmentally	  degrading	  procedures	  in	  their	  oil	  extraction.	  Until	  this	  time,	  the	  Ecuadorian	  government	  seemed	  unaware	  of	  the	  environmental	  risks	  posed	  by	  petroleum	  development	  because	  of	  the	  evident	  trust	  between	  Texaco	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and	  the	  government	  (Kimerling,	  2006,	  p.	  453).	  This	  represents	  a	  large	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  government	  and	  Texaco	  surrounding	  the	  environmentally	  safe	  policies.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  period	  before	  1990	  marks	  a	  time	  in	  which	  millions	  of	  gallons	  of	  toxic,	  untreated	  wastewater	  were	  dumped	  every	  day,	  staggering	  amounts	  of	  natural	  gas	  were	  burned,	  emitting	  greenhouse	  gases	  into	  the	  atmosphere,	  and	  large	  amounts	  of	  oil	  were	  spilled	  in	  the	  Amazon	  basin	  (Kimerling,	  2006,	  p.	  457).	  Kimerling	  (2006)	  noted	  that	  most	  of	  the	  pollution	  from	  Texaco’s	  oil	  extraction	  activities	  is	  situated	  in	  the	  Napo	  River	  basin,	  near	  the	  areas	  where	  five	  different	  indigenous	  tribes	  resided—the	  Kichwa,	  Huaorani,	  Cofan,	  Secoya,	  and	  Siona-­‐-­‐	  along	  with	  colonists	  from	  other	  parts	  of	  Ecuador	  (p.	  458).	  Deforestation	  due	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  roads	  and	  infrastructure	  surrounding	  the	  oil	  development,	  along	  with	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  people	  using	  these	  roads	  to	  reach	  forest	  areas	  that	  were	  previously	  inaccessible,	  led	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  much	  of	  these	  indigenous	  groups’	  land	  (Kimerling,	  2006,	  p.	  459). The	  Huaorani	  responded	  to	  the	  encroachment	  on	  their	  land	  with	  warrior-­‐like	  tendencies	  to	  scare	  the	  oil	  developers	  (Kimerling,	  2006,	  p.	  459).	  Following	  this,	  Texaco	  worked	  with	  Ecuador	  and	  missionaries	  to	  forcibly	  evict	  the	  Huaorani	  by	  means	  of	  aircraft	  and	  attempt	  to	  extinguish	  the	  Huaorani	  culture	  (Kimerling,	  2006,	  p.	  459).	  Here,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  a	  level	  of	  mistrust	  was	  created	  between	  the	  Ecuadorian	  government	  and	  indigenous	  groups.	  The	  Huaorani	  peoples	  were	  forced	  off	  their	  lands,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  capitalize	  on	  the	  profits	  of	  the	  oil	  industry,	  with	  no	  regard	  to	  the	  indigenous	  people’s	  claim	  to	  ancestral	  territory	  or	  their	  right	  to	  informed	  consent	  about	  the	  development	  that	  may	  take	  place	  on	  their	  lands.	  The	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Huaorani	  were	  not	  compensated	  at	  this	  time	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  their	  lands,	  water,	  natural	  resources,	  and,	  in	  a	  way,	  a	  dissemination	  of	  their	  culture	  (Kimerling,	  2006,	  p.	  460).	  The	  Huaorani,	  along	  with	  the	  other	  indigenous	  groups	  near	  the	  Napo	  River	  basin,	  have	  been	  left	  with	  a	  depletion	  of	  resources	  used	  for	  subsistence,	  leading	  to	  a	  greater	  dependence	  on	  outside	  markets,	  while	  having	  no	  financial	  resources	  to	  purchase	  goods	  from	  these	  markets	  (Kimerling,	  2006,	  p.	  462).	  Kimerling	  (2006)	  stated	  the	  “…distribution	  of	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  ‘development’	  has	  not	  been	  equitable.	  Indigenous	  communities	  continue	  to	  bear	  a	  disproportionate	  share	  of	  the	  costs	  without	  sharing	  in	  the	  benefits	  or	  participating	  in	  decision-­‐making	  that	  affects	  them”	  (p.	  466),	  showing	  that	  indigenous	  groups	  may	  not	  have	  much	  participation	  in	  democratic	  practices	  that	  may	  affect	  their	  groups	  forever,	  in	  terms	  of	  ecology,	  territory,	  and	  tradition.	  This	  situation	  marks	  a	  time	  in	  history	  when	  the	  indigenous	  people	  of	  Ecuador’s	  rights	  were	  seriously	  violated	  by	  the	  national	  government,	  which	  has	  the	  potential	  of	  making	  these	  groups	  wary	  of	  working	  with	  the	  national	  government	  in	  terms	  of	  land	  management. Articles	  261	  and	  74	  of	  Ecuador’s	  2008	  constitution	  give	  the	  Ecuadorian	  government	  sole	  jurisdiction	  over	  environmental	  resources	  and	  services,	  while	  positioning	  indigenous	  groups	  close	  to	  or	  inside	  confirmed	  conservation	  zones	  “under	  the	  National	  System	  of	  Protected	  Areas	  (SNAP)”	  (p.	  532),	  in	  which	  the	  national	  government	  retains	  authority	  over	  land	  management	  instead	  of	  indigenous	  communities	  (Reed,	  2011).	  	  Environmental	  services,	  like	  carbon	  stocks	  and	  water	  regulating	  services,	  are	  also	  property	  of	  the	  national	  government.	  Therefore,	  the	  government	  has	  jurisdiction	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  market	  these	  services	  to	  outside	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contenders,	  which	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  leave	  indigenous	  communities	  with	  the	  effects	  any	  government	  action	  may	  have	  on	  their	  territory	  (Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  533).	  If	  a	  REDD+	  mechanism	  is	  implemented	  in	  such	  territory,	  although	  the	  indigenous	  groups	  will	  have	  to	  be	  informed	  due	  to	  FPIC,	  the	  government	  retains	  sole	  jurisdiction	  over	  what	  happens.	  	  I	  relate	  the	  potential	  implementation	  of	  a	  REDD+	  mechanism	  in	  a	  government-­‐owned	  indigenous	  territory	  to	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  national	  Ecuadorian	  government	  has	  exploited	  indigenous	  territory	  due	  to	  the	  state’s	  ownership	  of	  land	  rights.	  For	  example,	  the	  Yasuni	  National	  Park,	  which	  is	  occupied	  by	  some	  of	  the	  Huaorani	  group,	  is	  government	  territory.	  Below	  the	  park,	  there	  are	  vast	  amounts	  of	  oil	  reserves	  holding	  nearly	  20%	  of	  the	  total	  oil	  reserves	  in	  Ecuador	  (GAIA	  Foundation).	  In	  2007,	  Ecuador’s	  president	  Rafael	  Correa	  proposed	  the	  Yasuni	  Initiative,	  to	  conserve	  the	  Yasuni	  National	  Park	  by	  not	  allowing	  oil	  extraction	  to	  take	  place	  in	  the	  park.	  In	  return	  for	  the	  conservation	  of	  this	  area,	  Correa	  sought	  funds	  from	  international	  donors	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  lost	  funds	  that	  would	  be	  generated	  from	  oil	  extraction	  activities.	  As	  Ecuador	  wanted	  nearly	  US$3.5	  billion	  for	  the	  initiative,	  the	  actual	  money	  received	  was	  only	  US$13	  million,	  so	  Correa	  backed	  down	  from	  plan	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2013	  (GAIA).	  Correa	  blamed	  the	  relinquishment	  of	  the	  plan	  on	  the	  international	  community,	  most	  notably	  the	  developed	  countries,	  which	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change,	  but	  have	  neglected	  to	  follow	  through	  with	  conservation	  funding.	  Now,	  oil	  extraction	  activities	  can	  take	  place	  in	  the	  Yasuni	  National	  Park,	  thus	  Huaorani	  territory.	  From	  CONFENIA’s	  (The	  Confederation	  of	  Nationalities	  Indigenous	  to	  the	  Amazon	  of	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Ecuador)	  point	  of	  view,	  Correa	  and	  the	  government	  of	  Ecuador	  have	  again	  shown	  indigenous	  groups	  that	  “the	  government	  was	  never	  really	  committed	  to	  the	  conservation	  of	  nature,	  beyond	  an	  advertising	  and	  media	  campaign	  to	  project	  an	  opposite	  image	  to	  the	  world”	  (p.	  13),	  reaffirming	  these	  groups’	  beliefs	  that	  the	  government	  does	  not	  care	  about	  their	  forests,	  rather	  the	  government	  seems	  to	  care	  more	  about	  economic	  profits	  (Becker,	  2011).	  If	  Correa	  received	  the	  funding	  for	  the	  Yasuni	  Initiative	  (thus	  making	  an	  economic	  profit),	  the	  project	  would	  be	  in	  effect.	  As	  he	  did	  not	  receive	  funding,	  he	  opted	  out	  of	  the	  Initiative	  to	  seek	  profit	  through	  capital	  development-­‐-­‐	  he	  still	  wants	  to	  make	  a	  profit	  somewhere.	  The	  mistrust	  between	  the	  indigenous	  groups	  of	  Ecuador	  and	  the	  Ecuadorian	  government	  remains	  apparent.	   There	  is	  another	  parallel	  that	  can	  be	  made	  between	  Ecuador’s	  REDD+	  Program,	  under	  UN-­‐REDD,	  and	  Ecuador’s	  Socio	  Bosque	  program.	  The	  Socio	  Bosque	  program	  “is	  a	  national	  government	  program	  that	  transfers	  direct	  economic	  incentives	  to	  rural	  families	  and	  local	  and	  indigenous	  communities	  that	  voluntarily	  commit	  to	  comply	  with	  clearly	  agreed	  conservation	  activities”	  (Koning	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  p.	  532).	  The	  main	  goal	  of	  the	  Socio	  Bosque	  program	  is	  to	  align	  environmental	  conservation	  with	  the	  reduction	  of	  poverty	  (Koning	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  533).	  In	  the	  Socio	  Bosque	  program,	  landowners,	  whether	  they	  are	  families,	  indigenous	  groups,	  or	  individuals,	  are	  paid	  compensation	  for	  each	  hectare	  that	  will	  be	  conserved,	  with	  a	  continuously	  decreasing	  compensation	  after	  fifty	  hectares	  (Koning	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  p.	  535).	  This	  decreasing	  incentive	  structure	  allows	  for	  socioeconomic	  equity,	  in	  that	  larger	  landowners	  will	  receive	  smaller	  payments	  per	  hectare	  as	  the	  size	  of	  the	  land	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conserved	  increases	  (Koning	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  539).	  Here,	  equitable	  distribution	  of	  funds	  in	  the	  Socio	  Bosque	  program	  is	  apparent.	  In	  order	  to	  receive	  funding	  in	  the	  Socio	  Bosque	  program,	  each	  landowner	  must	  create	  an	  investment	  plan	  for	  how	  the	  financial	  compensation	  provided	  by	  the	  program	  will	  be	  spent.	  An	  advantage	  of	  these	  investment	  plans	  in	  indigenous	  communities	  is	  that	  the	  plans	  provide	  for	  concrete	  ways	  in	  how	  the	  money	  will	  be	  used	  and	  can	  remove	  the	  doubt	  of	  corruption	  or	  misspending	  within	  the	  indigenous	  groups’	  leadership.	   How	  Socio	  Bosque	  differs	  from	  REDD+	  programs,	  and	  a	  reason	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  beneficial	  to	  those	  who	  partake	  in	  the	  program,	  is	  the	  fact	  the	  program	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  carbon-­‐trading	  mechanisms	  for	  funding	  and	  does	  not	  account	  for	  additionality,	  or	  “the	  process	  of	  determining	  whether	  a	  proposed	  activity	  is	  better	  than	  a	  specified	  baseline”	  (Koning	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  p.	  540)	  which	  means	  payments	  are	  provided	  for	  what	  already	  may	  have	  been	  conserved	  in	  the	  first	  place	  rather	  than	  payments	  for	  additional	  conservation	  efforts	  above	  the	  baseline	  (Gillenwater,	  2012,	  p.	  3).	  Paulsson	  (2009)	  defines	  baseline	  as	  the	  “counterfactual	  scenario	  describing	  the	  amount	  of	  GHGs	  that	  would	  be	  emitted	  if	  the	  project	  was	  not	  implemented,	  that	  is,	  under	  business-­‐as-­‐usual	  circumstances.”	  Instead,	  the	  incentives	  provided	  to	  the	  participating	  landowners,	  based	  solely	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  forest	  hectares	  conserved,	  allow	  for	  direct	  “Payments	  for	  Ecosystem	  Services	  (PES)”	  and	  do	  not	  involve	  an	  international	  carbon	  trading	  market	  (Koning	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  531).	  The	  indigenous	  Cófan	  of	  Ecuador	  have	  decided	  to	  partake	  in	  the	  Socio	  Bosque	  program	  for	  this	  reason,	  as	  working	  with	  carbon	  markets	  and	  placing	  specific	  economic	  values	  on	  ecosystem	  services	  (like	  carbon	  stocks)	  commodifies	  nature	  and	  places	  indigenous	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groups	  in	  a	  position	  to	  partake	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  economic	  mechanisms	  that	  hampered	  their	  existence	  and	  land	  ownership	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  540;	  544).	   With	  REDD+	  programs,	  indigenous	  people	  may	  tend	  to	  feel	  they	  are	  partaking	  in	  a	  perpetual	  cycle,	  in	  which	  their	  territory	  and	  land	  management	  are	  undermined	  by	  neoliberal	  policies	  and	  transnational	  corporations,	  while	  with	  a	  program	  like	  Socio	  Bosque,	  participation	  in	  such	  policies	  is	  not	  needed	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  544).	  Socio	  Bosque	  is	  financed	  by	  public	  funds,	  hence,	  not	  involving	  the	  international	  economy	  (Koning	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  p.	  534).	  In	  terms	  of	  additionality,	  Reed	  notes	  that	  the	  Socio	  Bosque	  program	  generates	  a	  path	  to	  provide	  financial	  incentives	  to	  indigenous	  groups	  that	  have	  been	  conserving	  their	  forests	  from	  the	  start	  and	  gives	  them	  the	  monetary	  assistance	  needed	  for	  these	  groups	  to	  continue	  in	  this	  effort	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011	  p.	  545).	  The	  Socio	  Bosque	  program	  is	  transparent	  and	  remains	  basic	  and	  fair	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  incentive	  structure	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  535).	   As	  participants	  in	  the	  Socio	  Bosque	  program	  must	  sign	  a	  contract	  affirming	  that	  their	  hectares	  of	  forest	  will	  be	  conserved	  for	  at	  least	  twenty	  years,	  there	  is	  no	  stipulation	  mentioning	  that	  the	  government	  must	  uphold	  their	  end	  of	  the	  agreement	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  543).	  This	  is	  a	  perceived	  problem	  with	  the	  program	  because,	  since	  the	  government	  of	  Ecuador	  owns	  all	  subsurface	  mining	  rights	  in	  indigenous	  lands,	  the	  government	  can	  still	  go	  into	  these	  lands	  for	  extraction	  purposes	  (P.	  Reed,	  2011,	  p.	  543).	  Thus,	  this	  represents	  a	  double	  standard	  in	  the	  national	  government’s	  Socio	  Bosque	  program-­‐-­‐	  although	  indigenous	  land	  owners	  will	  be	  held	  accountable	  if	  they	  enroll	  in	  the	  program	  and	  do	  not	  conserve	  their	  land,	  the	  government	  that	  created	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the	  program	  is	  able	  to	  exploit	  this	  land	  at	  any	  point	  in	  time,	  if	  it	  is	  in	  the	  national	  interest.	  Again,	  the	  past	  occurrences	  like	  that	  of	  Texaco	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  come	  into	  play	  and	  indigenous	  groups	  have	  doubt	  that	  the	  government	  will	  not	  enter	  their	  territory	  if	  oil	  exploitation	  and	  mining	  activities	  need	  to	  take	  place	  in	  order	  to	  sustain	  economic	  vitality.	  	  
 
Indonesia 	   Indonesia	  entered	  the	  preparation	  stage	  for	  REDD+	  in	  July	  2007,	  in	  which	  REDD+	  was	  still	  in	  the	  developmental	  process.	  The	  IFCA	  (Indonesian	  Forest	  Climate	  Alliance)	  was	  established	  to	  work	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Forestry	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  start	  in	  formulating	  REDD+	  readiness	  efforts	  and	  holding	  workshops	  to	  establish	  a	  framework	  for	  a	  national	  REDD+	  program.	  In	  2007,	  “the	  government	  of	  Indonesia	  hosted	  the	  13th	  session	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  (CoP)	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  the	  3rd	  session	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  serving	  as	  the	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol”	  (p.	  6)	  in	  Bali,	  which	  created	  mandates	  to	  discuss	  post-­‐2012	  implementations,	  such	  as	  the	  usage	  of	  financial	  carbon	  markets	  to	  reduce	  emissions	  in	  developing	  countries	  (UN-­‐REDD	  Indonesia).	  This	  conference	  was	  a	  landmark	  event	  in	  the	  global	  realm	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  spurred	  action	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change	  in	  Indonesia.	  A	  technical	  report	  called	  “REDDI:	  Reducing	  Emissions	  from	  Deforestation	  and	  Degradation	  in	  Indonesia-­‐	  REDD	  Methodology	  and	  Strategies:	  Summary	  for	  Policy	  Makers”	  was	  created	  by	  the	  IFCA	  and	  the	  Indonesian	  government	  to	  establish	  a	  REDD+	  framework,	  which	  has	  turned	  into	  Indonesia’s	  national	  REDD+	  program	  plan	  (UN-­‐REDD	  Indonesia,	  p.	  6).	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In	  2008,	  the	  Indonesia-­‐Australia	  Forest	  Carbon	  Partnership	  (IAFCP)	  was	  signed	  by	  Australia	  and	  Indonesia	  to	  create	  collaboration	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  to	  develop	  policy,	  technical	  assistance,	  and	  demonstration	  initiatives.	  The	  first	  REDD+	  pilot	  project,	  the	  Kalimantan	  Forests	  and	  Climate	  Partnership	  (KFCP),	  was	  launched	  in	  2009,	  which	  I	  will	  go	  into	  further	  detail	  about	  later	  (UN-­‐REDD	  Indonesia,	  p.	  8).	  The	  startup	  stage	  of	  Indonesia’s	  REDD+	  program	  began	  in	  fall	  of	  2009	  and	  four	  more	  REDD+	  demonstration	  initiatives	  were	  launched.	  A	  final	  plan	  was	  created	  for	  the	  program	  and	  the	  three	  implementation	  stages	  were	  put	  forward;	  the	  full	  implementation	  stage	  was	  to	  be	  reached	  by	  late	  2012.	  The	  official	  national	  program	  was	  launched	  in	  March	  of	  2010.	  In	  May	  of	  2010,	  a	  partnership	  agreement	  was	  established	  between	  Norway	  and	  Indonesia	  to	  work	  together	  to	  reduce	  deforestation,	  conversion	  of	  peatlands,	  and	  degradation	  of	  forests.	  The	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  in	  Indonesia	  has	  a	  funding	  allocation	  of	  US	  $5.6	  million	  (UN-­‐REDD.org). An	  instance	  in	  which	  the	  government	  of	  Indonesia	  has	  faltered	  at	  upholding	  the	  interests	  of	  indigenous	  communities,	  in	  regards	  to	  customary	  land	  management,	  is	  relevant	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Freeport-­‐McMoRan	  Copper	  &	  Gold	  Inc.	  (i.e.	  Freeport),	  a	  company	  that	  conducts	  mining	  operations	  in	  the	  Mimika	  region	  of	  Papua,	  an	  Indonesian	  province	  (Abrash,	  2002,	  p.	  2).	  In	  the	  1960s,	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  region	  of	  Papua	  was	  transferred	  from	  the	  Dutch	  to	  government	  of	  Indonesia,	  an	  action	  that	  was	  conducted	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  (Abrash,	  2002,	  p.	  5).	  The	  indigenous	  peoples	  living	  in	  Papua	  at	  the	  time	  were	  not	  consulted	  with	  nor	  included	  in	  the	  negotiations	  about	  the	  future	  of	  their	  territory.	  Against	  the	  will	  of	  the	  Papuans,	  Papua	  became	  an	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Indonesian	  province	  instead	  of	  becoming	  an	  independent,	  self-­‐governing	  state	  (Abrash,	  2002,	  p.	  6).	   The	  Indonesian	  government	  held	  an	  event	  called	  the	  Act	  of	  Free	  Choice	  (AFC)	  in	  1969	  to	  secure	  sovereignty	  over	  Papua	  in	  front	  of	  UN	  delegates,	  an	  event	  that	  undermined	  Papuans’	  abilities	  to	  freely	  state	  their	  opinion	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  wanted	  to	  become	  part	  of	  Indonesia	  due	  to	  speculation	  that	  the	  Indonesian	  government	  removed	  Papuans’	  votes	  from	  the	  register	  (Abrash,	  2002,	  p.	  5).	  This	  was	  the	  official	  recognition	  of	  Papua	  as	  an	  Indonesian	  territory.	  The	  Basic	  Agrarian	  Law	  of	  1960	  and	  the	  Forestry	  Act	  of	  1967	  give	  the	  central	  government	  of	  Indonesia	  control	  of	  lands	  and	  remove	  “ulayat”	  rights,	  or	  customary	  land	  rights,	  along	  with	  placing	  indigenous	  territory	  into	  the	  “State	  Forestry”	  category,	  thus	  placing	  the	  lands	  of	  the	  indigenous	  groups	  of	  Papua	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Indonesian	  government.	  Prior	  to	  the	  AFC	  meeting,	  the	  US-­‐based	  company	  Freeport	  and	  the	  Indonesian	  government	  under	  Suharto	  signed	  into	  a	  Contract	  of	  Work	  (COW),	  which	  gave	  Freeport	  the	  right	  to	  remove	  and	  resettle	  Papuan	  indigenous	  groups	  from	  their	  traditional	  land	  (only	  needing	  to	  provide	  compensation	  to	  these	  peoples	  for	  permanent	  structures,	  not	  for	  natural	  resources,	  land,	  or	  water)	  (Abrash,	  2002,	  p.	  6-­‐7).	   Two	  of	  the	  most	  notable	  groups	  that	  Freeport’s	  incursion	  has	  affected	  are	  the	  Kamoro	  and	  Amungme	  indigenous	  peoples,	  who	  have	  traditionally	  lived	  on	  the	  lands	  of	  Papua	  for	  a	  very	  long	  time.	  Under	  the	  COW,	  the	  “ulayat”	  rights,	  or	  customary	  land	  rights,	  of	  the	  Kamoro	  and	  Amungme	  groups	  were	  removed	  without	  consultation	  or	  agreement	  from	  these	  local	  groups	  (Abrash,	  2002,	  p.	  7).	  The	  COW	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did	  not	  contain	  any	  compensation	  for	  the	  nature	  that	  would	  be	  lost	  due	  to	  Freeport’s	  mining	  activities,	  such	  as	  water	  resources	  for	  fishing	  and	  drinking,	  forest	  resources,	  and	  sacred	  places,	  among	  others	  (Abrash,	  2002,	  p.	  7).	  Abrash	  (2002)	  noted	  that	  “the	  indigenous	  population	  had	  no	  legally	  available	  rights	  of	  refusal,	  of	  informed	  consent,	  or	  to	  adequate	  compensation”	  (p.	  7),	  exhibiting	  the	  undermining	  of	  these	  local	  groups’	  ability	  to	  manage	  the	  resources	  on	  their	  ancestral	  lands.	  Freeport	  gave	  the	  Indonesian	  government	  monetary	  and	  logistical	  assistance	  to	  aid	  in	  military	  and	  police	  security	  to	  protect	  the	  company’s	  mine	  sites,	  a	  stipulation	  which	  is	  not	  mentioned	  in	  the	  COWs	  of	  1967	  or	  1991,	  thus	  not	  having	  a	  basis	  for	  legality	  (Abrash,	  2002,	  p.	  9).	  Both	  the	  Indonesian	  military	  and	  police	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  numerous	  human	  rights	  violations	  against	  the	  Amungme	  and	  Kamoro	  peoples,	  such	  as	  murders	  and	  sexual	  assaults,	  among	  others	  (Abrash,	  2002,	  p.	  8).	  Here,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  there	  is	  an	  enormous	  level	  of	  distrust	  between	  the	  Indonesian	  government	  and	  the	  indigenous	  Amungme	  and	  Kamoro	  peoples	  due	  to	  land-­‐takings	  and	  the	  government	  not	  informing	  these	  groups.	  This	  tight	  linkage	  between	  the	  Indonesian	  government	  and	  an	  international	  corporation	  exhibits	  the	  detrimental	  effects	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  can	  have	  on	  the	  relations	  between	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  their	  government,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  Indonesian	  government’s	  exploitation	  of	  the	  Amungme	  and	  Kamoro	  people	  and	  their	  natural	  resources	  for	  profit.	   This	  posits	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  economic	  incentives	  may	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  drive	  the	  Indonesian	  government	  to	  conserve	  forests	  and	  keep	  the	  profits	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme’s	  use	  of	  carbon	  markets,	  while	  leaving	  the	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indigenous	  peoples	  out	  of	  the	  loop	  and	  without	  monetary	  assistance.	  As	  research	  on	  the	  environmental	  degradation	  caused	  by	  Freeport’s	  mining	  activities	  was	  not	  conducted	  by	  the	  Indonesian	  government,	  an	  assessment	  conducted	  by	  the	  “US	  Overseas	  Private	  Investment	  Corporation	  (OPIC)”	  in	  1994	  referred	  to	  many	  damages	  caused	  by	  Freeport’s	  activities,	  most	  notably	  tailings	  waste	  disposed	  of	  in	  rivers	  that	  affected	  the	  ecosystems	  in	  and	  around	  the	  rivers,	  along	  with	  residents	  near	  the	  rivers	  whose	  health	  had	  been	  negatively	  impacted	  by	  the	  pollution	  (Abrash,	  2002,	  p.	  10).	  The	  Amungme	  hold	  a	  notion	  that	  is	  common	  among	  many	  indigenous	  groups-­‐-­‐	  that	  the	  land	  and	  nature	  are	  their	  mother-­‐-­‐	  a	  notion	  that	  was	  seriously	  disregarded	  nor	  respected	  by	  the	  Indonesian	  government	  and	  Freeport	  (Abrash,	  2002,	  p.	  11).	   As	  an	  effort	  of	  redress	  and	  under	  pressure	  of	  the	  international	  community,	  Freeport	  created	  the	  “One	  Percent	  Trust	  Fund	  Offer,”	  in	  which	  one	  percent	  of	  Freeport’s	  yearly	  earnings	  would	  be	  appointed	  to	  development	  strategies	  for	  Papua	  (Abrash,	  2002,	  p.	  12).	  The	  Offer	  has	  been	  criticized	  by	  many	  because	  it	  has	  created	  a	  dependency	  relationship	  between	  the	  indigenous	  communities	  and	  foreign	  funding,	  while	  creating	  tensions	  between	  the	  indigenous	  communities	  of	  Papua	  (Abrash,	  2002,	  p.	  11).	  With	  connecting	  this	  instance	  to	  national	  REDD+	  programs	  that	  may	  be	  implemented	  in	  Indonesia,	  there	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  REDD+	  programs	  funded	  by	  foreign	  donors	  under	  UN-­‐REDD	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  create	  a	  relationship	  of	  dependency	  on	  foreign	  funding.	  There	  is	  a	  great	  chance	  that	  the	  indigenous	  peoples	  of	  Papua	  do	  not	  feel	  justly	  compensated	  for	  the	  degradation	  of	  their	  ancestral	  lands,	  the	  biodiversity	  and	  species	  that	  have	  been	  lost	  due	  to	  Freeport’s	  operations,	  the	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human	  rights	  violations	  that	  have	  been	  committed	  by	  the	  Indonesian	  military	  and	  police	  under	  Freeport’s	  funding,	  or	  the	  unjustified	  taking	  of	  their	  land	  by	  the	  government	  of	  Indonesia	  in	  the	  1960s.	  It	  is	  apparent	  that	  there	  is	  a	  large	  gap	  of	  trust	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  bridged	  between	  the	  national	  government	  and	  international	  corporation	  sector	  and	  the	  indigenous	  Amungme	  and	  Kamoro	  peoples	  of	  Indonesia.	  If	  this	  trust	  is	  not	  built,	  indigenous	  groups	  like	  the	  Amungme	  and	  Kamoro	  may	  be	  reluctant	  to	  support	  a	  national	  REDD+	  program	  that	  is	  enacted	  under	  the	  government	  of	  Indonesia.	  The	  implementation	  of	  a	  national	  REDD+	  mechanism	  in	  indigenous	  territories	  of	  Indonesia	  may	  represent	  an	  endless	  cycle	  of	  oppression	  by	  the	  national	  government	  to	  these	  indigenous	  peoples,	  a	  perceived	  vision	  that	  may	  be	  hard	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  in	  their	  eyes	  due	  to	  the	  past	  exploitation	  they	  have	  suffered.	  REDD+	  may	  create	  this	  cycle	  of	  oppression	  because,	  if	  local	  participation	  and	  FPIC	  principles	  are	  not	  respected,	  along	  with	  no	  recognition	  of	  customary	  land	  tenure,	  like	  was	  apparent	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Freeport,	  the	  indigenous	  peoples	  may	  feel	  subject	  to	  unjust	  treatment	  by	  the	  national	  government. In	  terms	  of	  the	  REDD+	  program	  in	  Indonesia,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  introduce	  some	  negative	  effects	  of	  a	  REDD+	  pilot	  project	  in	  the	  peatlands	  of	  Central	  Kalimantan.	  Peatlands	  hold	  nearly	  20	  times	  the	  amount	  of	  carbon	  as	  rainforests	  and,	  when	  deforested,	  do	  not	  release	  all	  of	  the	  carbon	  right	  away.	  Instead,	  peatlands	  continue	  to	  emit	  carbon	  during	  the	  processes	  of	  decomposition	  and	  burning	  over	  the	  course	  of	  many	  years	  (Olbrei	  and	  Howes,	  2012,	  p.	  7).	  The	  peatlands	  of	  Central	  Kalimantan	  were	  the	  previous	  location	  of	  former	  President	  Suharto’s	  Mega	  Rice	  Project,	  a	  project	  that	  introduced	  the	  conversion	  of	  the	  swampy	  peatlands	  to	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agricultural	  land	  for	  the	  production	  of	  rice	  in	  1995.	  Although	  the	  water	  was	  drained	  from	  the	  peatlands	  by	  constructed	  canals,	  rice	  was	  not	  able	  to	  grow	  in	  this	  area	  because	  the	  canals	  that	  were	  created	  exposed	  the	  soil	  and	  “minerals	  such	  as	  pyrite	  oxidized,	  creating	  sulfuric	  acid,”	  resulting	  in	  an	  area	  of	  empty	  peatland	  (Living	  on	  Earth).	  Due	  to	  the	  deforestation	  and	  draining	  of	  the	  peatland,	  fires	  are	  very	  prevalent	  and	  produce	  intense	  haze	  and	  emit	  high	  concentrations	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  because	  peatlands	  store	  a	  lot	  of	  carbon,	  thus	  releasing	  carbon	  dioxide	  when	  burned.	  The	  people	  who	  live	  in	  and	  around	  this	  area	  are	  the	  Dayak	  indigenous	  peoples,	  who	  use	  the	  peatland	  for	  small-­‐scale	  crop	  production	  (Olbrei	  and	  Howes,	  2012,	  p.	  8).	   The	  Kalimantan	  Forests	  and	  Climate	  Partnership	  (KFCP)	  was	  introduced	  in	  2007	  (implemented	  in	  2008)	  as	  a	  $100	  million	  joint	  partnership	  between	  Australia	  and	  Indonesia	  to	  curb	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions,	  heralding	  specific	  targets	  to	  reduce	  peatland	  deforestation	  by	  the	  means	  of	  protection,	  reforest	  peatland	  by	  the	  planting	  of	  trees,	  and	  reflood	  the	  dry	  peatland	  area	  (Olbrei	  and	  Howes,	  2012,	  p.	  9).	  According	  to	  an	  Australian	  KFCP	  information	  sheet	  regarding	  the	  program,	  the	  specific	  targets	  are	  as	  follows:	  70,000	  hectares	  of	  peatland	  to	  be	  protected,	  200,000	  hectares	  of	  peatland	  to	  be	  reforested	  and	  reflooded,	  and	  100	  million	  trees	  to	  be	  planted	  (AUS	  Factsheet).	  Nonetheless,	  as	  of	  2012,	  only	  50,000	  trees	  had	  been	  reforested,	  while	  the	  effort	  to	  reflood	  was	  seemingly	  forgotten	  about	  (REDD-­‐Monitor).	  Only	  $31	  million	  dollars	  out	  of	  the	  $100	  million	  was	  given	  to	  the	  project.	   Besides	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  project	  targets	  were	  overestimated,	  the	  indigenous	  Dayak	  people’s	  traditional	  forest	  rights	  were	  violated	  in	  the	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implementation	  of	  the	  KFCP	  project.	  As	  the	  KFCP	  works	  directly	  with	  Indonesia’s	  Forestry	  sector	  and	  indigenous	  people’s	  “ulayat”	  rights	  are	  not	  protected	  by	  the	  Indonesian	  government	  under	  the	  Forestry	  law,	  the	  KFCP	  undermined	  the	  ability	  of	  local	  land	  managers	  to	  work	  with	  the	  program	  and	  serve	  as	  equal	  partners	  (Down	  to	  Earth	  82).	  The	  Dayak	  people	  of	  Central	  Kalimantan	  have	  shown	  opposition	  to	  the	  project	  since	  the	  beginning	  due	  to	  the	  violation	  of	  FPIC	  stipulations	  under	  UN-­‐REDD,	  as	  the	  head	  developer	  of	  the	  KFCP	  project	  never	  asked	  for	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  Dayak	  peoples	  about	  the	  project,	  nor	  never	  explained	  the	  scope,	  threats	  on	  livelihood	  activities,	  and	  restricted	  access	  of	  indigenous	  lands	  from	  the	  project	  (REDD-­‐Monitor).	  Instead,	  the	  KFCP	  project	  managers	  have	  been	  working	  directly	  with	  the	  Indonesian	  forestry	  sector	  under	  the	  central	  government	  and	  ignoring	  the	  requests	  of	  the	  community,	  thus	  having	  the	  potential	  to	  undermine	  these	  local	  peoples’	  abilities	  to	  manage	  their	  land	  and	  resources.	  This	  exhibits	  the	  possible	  consequences	  that	  REDD+	  can	  have	  on	  local	  communities	  and	  decentralized	  forms	  of	  forest	  management	  by	  holding	  to	  more	  centralized	  forms	  of	  forest	  management.	   A	  2012	  letter	  from	  sixteen	  Dayaks	  to	  Mr.	  Narang,	  the	  governor	  of	  Central	  Kalimantan,	  noted	  flaws	  with	  the	  program.	  The	  Dayaks	  pointed	  out	  various	  faults	  in	  the	  program,	  one	  being	  that	  the	  KFCP	  project	  managers	  did	  not	  allow	  for	  the	  villagers	  to	  be	  actual	  participants	  in	  the	  program,	  rather	  the	  villagers	  were	  compensated	  a	  low	  sum	  below	  minimum	  wage	  to	  plant	  trees	  in	  the	  peatland	  area.	  After	  the	  planting	  of	  the	  trees,	  the	  Dayaks	  were	  left	  out	  of	  the	  maintenance	  aspect	  of	  the	  program	  and	  the	  trees	  died.	  This	  projects	  a	  lack	  of	  community	  involvement	  in	  the	  project	  and	  removes	  control	  of	  land	  resources	  by	  the	  local	  people.	  Also,	  the	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letter	  noted	  a	  high	  level	  of	  non-­‐transparency	  with	  the	  program,	  in	  that	  information	  about	  the	  project	  and	  the	  funding	  was	  not	  made	  available	  to	  the	  local	  people.	  It	  was	  noted	  that	  both	  the	  “lack	  of	  participation	  and	  intransparency	  bring	  some	  negative	  impacts	  such	  as	  conflicts	  between	  communities	  against	  project	  operator	  and	  developer,”	  citing	  examples	  like	  fighting,	  protesting,	  and	  the	  burning	  of	  buildings	  (REDD-­‐Monitor).	  This	  is	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  UN-­‐REDD’s	  inclusion	  of	  participatory-­‐based	  involvement	  in	  the	  Programme.	  The	  Dayak	  peoples	  also	  asked	  to	  construct	  an	  “alternative	  livelihood	  program,”	  which	  was	  disregarded,	  as	  the	  people	  were	  told	  to	  comply	  with	  whatever	  program	  the	  project	  developer	  had	  decided	  (REDD-­‐Monitor).	   In	  regards	  to	  the	  reflooding	  of	  the	  peatland	  and	  the	  blocking	  of	  the	  canals	  that	  were	  formerly	  used	  to	  the	  drain	  the	  area,	  the	  canals	  are	  blocked	  from	  timber	  derived	  from	  outside	  the	  KFCP	  project	  area.	  Thus,	  the	  Dayaks	  state	  that	  this	  conflicts	  with	  the	  overall	  objective	  of	  the	  project	  to	  obtain	  emissions	  reductions	  by	  stopping	  deforestation.	  The	  project	  tends	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  Indonesian	  military	  and	  police	  to	  solve	  disputes	  between	  the	  Dayaks	  and	  the	  KFCP	  project	  managers,	  resulting	  in	  prosecution	  of	  the	  locals	  who	  protest	  the	  project,	  which	  goes	  against	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme’s	  focus	  on	  human	  rights	  based	  approaches	  that	  should	  be	  included	  in	  forest	  management.	  Another	  large	  discrepancy	  in	  the	  program	  is	  the	  blind	  eye	  that	  is	  turned	  to	  the	  surrounding	  exploitative	  activities,	  like	  the	  logging,	  oil	  palm,	  and	  mining	  industries,	  near	  the	  project.	  As	  the	  KFCP’s	  goal	  is	  to	  “demonstrate	  a	  credible,	  just	  and	  effective	  means	  to	  significantly	  reduce	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  from	  deforestation	  and	  forest	  degradation,	  including	  from	  peatland	  degradation”	  (p.	  2),	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the	  blind	  eye	  turned	  to	  industries	  producing	  deforestation	  presents	  the	  divide	  between	  the	  program’s	  perceived	  want	  to	  combat	  deforestation	  and	  the	  actuality	  of	  what	  the	  program	  is	  doing	  (Forest	  Peoples	  Programme,	  2011).	  It	  is	  apparent	  that,	  by	  working	  with	  the	  Indonesian	  forestry	  sector	  and	  not	  with	  the	  local	  indigenous	  peoples	  of	  Kalimantan,	  the	  KFCP	  perpetuates	  the	  marginalization	  of	  the	  indigenous	  Dayaks	  by	  supporting	  a	  forestry	  department	  that	  does	  not	  protect	  the	  customary	  land	  rights	  of	  local	  indigenous	  peoples	  (Down	  to	  Earth	  82).	   Lastly,	  the	  original	  KFCP	  document	  notes	  BHP-­‐Billiton,	  an	  international	  mining	  corporation,	  as	  an	  original	  partner	  in	  the	  KFCP	  agreement.	  BHP-­‐Billiton	  has	  formerly	  led	  development	  operations	  in	  Kalimantan	  and	  continues	  to	  produce	  coal.	  BHP-­‐Billiton	  is	  trying	  to	  offset	  their	  carbon	  emissions	  by	  investing	  money	  into	  the	  REDD+	  program.	  A	  REDD-­‐monitor	  article	  (2011)	  notes	  that	  “companies	  hope	  to	  continue	  mining,	  while	  investing	  comparatively	  small	  amounts	  of	  money	  in	  REDD	  credits	  to	  ‘offset’	  the	  destruction,”	  which	  has	  generated	  criticism	  of	  the	  program	  and	  its	  choice	  of	  partners	  (REDD-­‐monitor.org).	  This	  is	  because	  of	  the	  destruction	  of	  biodiversity	  and	  the	  climate	  that	  results	  from	  mining	  and	  BHP-­‐Billiton’s	  proposed	  mining	  expansions	  that	  the	  company	  seeks	  to	  offset	  by	  purchasing	  low-­‐priced	  carbon	  credits.	  Here,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  capitalism	  has	  prevailed	  in	  the	  KFCP,	  as	  a	  large	  mining	  company	  is	  a	  monetary	  donor,	  the	  indigenous	  Dayak’s	  forest	  rights	  are	  not	  being	  respected,	  and	  the	  Indonesian	  forestry	  sector	  (thus	  the	  Indonesian	  government)	  is	  using	  the	  program	  as	  a	  means	  to	  attract	  revenue.	  This	  scenario	  represents	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  economic	  profit	  derived	  from	  carbon	  markets,	  thus	  partaking	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  capitalism,	  will	  actually	  help	  indigenous	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peoples	  living	  near	  the	  forest,	  or	  if	  the	  use	  of	  a	  capitalism-­‐based	  carbon	  market	  will	  further	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo	  of	  marginalized	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  a	  powerful	  government	  sector	  relying	  on	  economic	  profit	  derived	  from	  such	  markets.	  	  
 
Tanzania 	   After	  the	  UNFCCC	  COP13,	  Tanzania	  decided	  to	  consult	  stakeholders	  for	  REDD+	  efforts	  in	  2008	  to	  create	  a	  general	  proposal	  outline.	  Tanzania	  and	  Norway	  established	  a	  bilateral	  agreement	  to	  partner	  in	  reducing	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  and	  deforestation.	  Initial	  REDD+	  efforts	  were	  proposed	  in	  2009	  by	  the	  Tanzanian	  government,	  NGOs,	  and	  the	  Norwegian	  partners.	  Norway	  is	  the	  primary	  fund	  donor	  and	  allocated	  US	  $100	  million,	  over	  five	  years,	  for	  the	  Tanzania	  national	  REDD+	  program.	  In	  2009,	  a	  final	  framework	  document	  for	  the	  national	  REDD+	  program	  in	  Tanzania	  was	  created	  and	  nine	  pilot	  initiatives	  were	  established	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  promote	  “REDD+	  readiness”	  and	  are	  run	  by	  various	  NGOs	  (nongovernmental	  organizations).	  The	  final	  framework	  document	  notes	  important	  matters	  to	  be	  confronted	  in	  the	  Tanzania	  REDD+	  program,	  such	  as	  stakeholder	  relations	  and	  how	  to	  resolve	  the	  problems	  within	  these	  relations	  (UN-­‐REDD	  Tanzania,	  p.	  65).	  The	  principal	  activities	  in	  this	  document	  include	  “(i)	  the	  funding	  of	  pilot	  projects	  that	  experiment	  with	  different	  modalities	  of	  implementing	  REDD	  at	  local	  level	  and	  (ii)	  the	  commissioning	  of	  studies	  to	  inform	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  institutional	  framework	  for	  REDD”	  (UN-­‐REDD	  Tanzania,	  p.	  66).	  The	  first	  national	  project	  (March	  2008-­‐April	  2011)	  involved	  creating	  a	  National	  REDD+	  task	  force	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  prepare	  Tanzania	  for	  a	  national	  REDD+	  program	  by	  creating	  a	  strategy	  and	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implementation	  plan	  through	  a	  collaborative	  framework.	  During	  project	  two	  (October	  2011-­‐September	  2013),	  Tanzania’s	  “National	  REDD	  Strategy	  and	  Action	  Plan”	  was	  finalized,	  implementation	  and	  monitoring	  mechanisms	  were	  strengthened,	  an	  outreach	  proposal	  was	  implemented,	  and	  engagement	  between	  stakeholders	  was	  facilitated	  (reddtz.org).	   	   As	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  and	  national	  REDD+	  initiatives	  have	  only	  been	  running	  for	  a	  few	  years,	  I	  will	  mention	  a	  case	  in	  which	  rural	  Tanzanian	  villagers	  were	  affected	  by	  the	  development	  of	  a	  biofuel	  company	  near	  their	  traditional	  lands.	  This	  case	  reflects	  upon	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  land	  was	  taken	  from	  the	  villagers,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  spur	  economic	  profit	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  Tanzanian	  government	  and	  a	  multinational	  corporation,	  Sun	  Biofuels.	  With	  the	  presentation	  of	  this	  case,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  point	  out	  the	  injustices	  felt	  by	  the	  local	  Tanzanian	  villagers	  and	  the	  ways	  their	  traditional	  livelihoods	  have	  changed,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  correlate	  this	  with	  the	  proposed	  effect	  REDD+	  projects	  may	  have	  on	  villagers’	  access	  to	  local	  land	  and	  resources.	  In	  Tanzania,	  like	  many	  other	  African	  countries,	  many	  villagers	  live	  off	  of	  the	  land	  by	  partaking	  in	  subsistence	  agriculture	  and	  collecting	  forest	  products,	  such	  as	  wild	  plants,	  fuelwood	  for	  fires,	  and	  honey	  (Carrington,	  2011).	  	  I	  am	  going	  to	  interlink	  African	  villagers	  with	  forest	  dependent	  peoples,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  both	  follow	  more	  traditional	  ways	  of	  managing	  the	  land	  than	  modern	  efforts	  and	  that	  both	  of	  these	  groups	  tend	  to	  live	  off	  the	  land	  and	  its	  resources.	  An	  instance	  in	  which	  the	  government	  of	  Tanzania	  has	  faltered	  at	  upholding	  the	  interests	  of	  villagers,	  in	  regards	  to	  customary	  land	  management,	  is	  relevant	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Sun	  Biofuels	  development	  in	  Kisarawe	  (Bergius,	  2012,	  p.	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1).	  Biofuel	  cultivation	  consists	  of	  cultivating	  various	  crops,	  like	  jatropha,	  oil	  palm,	  and	  sugarcane,	  and	  then	  processing	  these	  crops	  to	  create	  agrofuels	  (biofuels)	  	  (Focus	  on	  Land	  in	  Africa,	  2010,	  p.	  2).	  With	  the	  “growing	  concerns	  over	  high	  oil	  prices,	  energy	  security,	  and	  climate	  change”	  (p.	  2),	  biofuels	  are	  viewed,	  by	  some,	  as	  the	  answer	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  world’s	  dependence	  on	  coal,	  natural	  gas,	  and	  oil	  and	  thus	  serve	  as	  a	  more	  sustainable	  answer	  to	  energy	  concerns	  (Focus	  on	  Land	  in	  Africa,	  2010).	   In	  Tanzania,	  the	  central	  government	  has	  implemented	  a	  “‘kilimo	  kwanza’	  (agriculture	  first)	  initiative”	  (pg.	  1)	  in	  which	  development	  efforts	  are	  to	  be	  targeted	  through	  agriculture,	  as	  much	  of	  the	  Tanzanian	  population	  lives	  in	  rural	  areas	  and	  could	  benefit	  from	  this	  effort	  (Bergius,	  2012).	  The	  “kilimo	  kwanza”	  initiative	  vests	  interest	  in	  private	  sector	  outsiders,	  such	  as	  Multinational	  Corporations	  (MNCs),	  to	  invest	  in	  and	  commercialize	  agriculture	  in	  rural	  Tanzanian	  areas.	  Therefore,	  the	  Tanzanian	  government	  is	  encouraging	  outside	  investment	  in	  areas	  made	  available	  for	  biofuel	  cultivation	  and	  processing.	  The	  government	  has	  been	  allocating	  “Village	  Land”	  for	  these	  efforts;	  under	  this	  classification,	  village	  councils	  are	  responsible	  for	  decisions	  regarding	  land	  management	  under	  The	  Village	  Land	  Act,	  but	  this	  land	  can	  be	  transferred	  by	  the	  president	  or	  village	  council	  to	  the	  classification	  of	  “General	  Land”	  if	  the	  transfer	  serves	  public	  interest	  (Focus	  on	  Land	  in	  Africa,	  2010,	  p.	  5).	  If	  the	  land	  transfer	  necessitates	  more	  than	  250	  hectares,	  the	  government	  of	  Tanzania	  can	  justify	  this	  as	  serving	  the	  public	  interest,	  therefore	  taking	  away	  land	  jurisdiction	  from	  the	  village	  authorities	  (Bergius,	  2012,	  p.	  3).	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The	  Land	  Act	  defines	  three	  categories	  of	  land	  (Village,	  General,	  and	  Reserved),	  in	  which	  “Village	  Land”	  is	  held	  as	  by	  customary	  land	  tenure	  (Focus	  on	  Land	  in	  Africa,	  2010,	  p.	  4).	  There	  is	  a	  contradiction	  between	  The	  Land	  Act’s	  and	  The	  Village	  Land	  Act’s	  definitions	  of	  “General	  Land.”	  The	  Land	  Act’s	  definition	  holds	  that	  “unoccupied	  or	  unused	  village	  land”	  is	  constitutive	  of	  General	  Land,	  whereas	  The	  Village	  Land	  Act	  defines	  General	  Land	  as	  a	  “residual	  category,”	  or	  land	  that	  cannot	  be	  classified	  as	  Reserved	  Land	  or	  Village	  Land	  (Focus	  on	  Land	  in	  Africa,	  2010,	  p.	  5).	  General	  Land	  is	  under	  management	  by	  the	  Commissioner	  of	  Lands,	  a	  sector	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Lands,	  Housing	  and	  Human	  Settlements	  Development,	  which	  can	  give	  rights	  of	  occupancy	  of	  General	  Land	  to	  foreign	  investors	  (Focus	  on	  Land	  in	  Africa,	  2010,	  p.	  5).	  This	  discrepancy	  creates	  issues	  with	  land	  tenure,	  in	  that	  the	  Tanzanian	  government	  can	  deem	  village	  land	  that	  is	  “unoccupied	  and	  unused”	  as	  General	  Land,	  while	  the	  village	  council	  views	  these	  lands	  as	  Village	  Lands	  that	  are	  used	  for	  subsistence	  activities,	  the	  collection	  of	  forest	  products,	  and	  grazing	  areas	  for	  livestock,	  thus	  potentially	  undermining	  the	  villagers’	  ability	  to	  manage	  their	  traditional	  lands	  (Focus	  on	  Land	  in	  Africa,	  2010,	  p.	  5).	   Thus,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Sun	  Biofuels,	  an	  area	  of	  around	  8,200	  hectares	  was	  allocated	  to	  cultivate	  jatropha	  and	  for	  processing	  facilities	  by	  district	  officials,	  without	  respecting	  the	  FPIC	  principle	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  local	  villagers	  (Bergius,	  2012,	  p.	  3).	  Though	  Sun	  Biofuels	  and	  district	  officials	  claim	  they	  consulted	  and	  negotiated	  with	  the	  villagers	  around	  the	  plantation	  area	  about	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  agrofuel	  project,	  villagers	  note	  that	  the	  meetings	  were	  rather	  informational	  about	  benefits	  the	  villagers	  would	  receive	  for	  the	  project	  and	  not	  a	  negotiation	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about	  the	  proposed	  development	  (Focus	  on	  Land	  in	  Africa,	  2010,	  p.	  3).	  Only	  the	  benefits	  were	  mentioned	  and	  not	  potential	  costs	  that	  villagers	  would	  bear	  due	  to	  the	  project.	  In	  this	  case,	  FPIC	  was	  not	  respected	  because	  Sun	  Biofuels	  promised	  benefits	  (that	  were	  not	  actually	  followed	  through	  with)	  to	  coerce	  the	  local	  villagers	  to	  be	  supportive	  of	  the	  project,	  without	  mentioning	  detrimental	  losses	  that	  could	  be	  incurred	  from	  the	  project.	  The	  promised	  benefits	  were	  never	  solidified	  by	  a	  written	  agreement,	  thus	  taking	  away	  accountability	  from	  the	  company	  if	  the	  benefits	  were	  never	  received	  by	  the	  villagers,	  and	  not	  establishing	  approved	  consent	  of	  the	  project	  by	  the	  villagers	  (Focus	  on	  Land	  in	  Africa,	  2010,	  p.	  3).	  Many	  of	  the	  benefits	  were	  not	  received	  by	  the	  villagers	  and	  communities	  surrounding	  Sun	  Biofuels	  development	  area;	  promises	  included	  road	  infrastructure,	  the	  construction	  of	  schools	  and	  healthcare	  facilities,	  the	  establishment	  of	  water	  wells,	  and	  generation	  of	  employment	  (Focus	  on	  Land	  in	  Africa,	  2010,	  p.	  3).	   The	  villagers	  were	  also	  supposed	  to	  be	  compensated	  financially	  for	  the	  lost	  land.	  The	  bush	  and	  forest	  land	  given	  to	  Sun	  Biofuels	  was	  used	  by	  local	  villagers	  for	  various	  activities,	  such	  as	  “grazing,	  charcoal	  production,	  and	  the	  harvesting	  of	  timber,	  poles,	  firewood,	  wild	  food,	  fodder,	  and	  medicine”	  (p.	  4)	  that	  allowed	  for	  income	  and	  food	  security	  apart	  from	  agriculture	  (Focus	  on	  Land	  in	  Africa,	  2010).	  Once	  the	  villagers	  no	  longer	  had	  access	  to	  these	  lands,	  there	  was	  a	  greatly	  increased	  reliance	  on	  agriculture	  to	  provide	  food	  and	  income,	  while	  many	  products	  villagers	  used	  to	  collect	  have	  to	  be	  purchased	  or	  collected	  in	  areas	  far	  from	  the	  village,	  thus	  imposing	  economic	  strain	  on	  these	  people	  (Focus	  on	  Land	  in	  Africa,	  2010,	  p.	  4).	  The	  price	  of	  many	  products	  that	  used	  to	  be	  collected	  have	  increased	  due	  to	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transportation	  costs,	  which	  means	  less	  money	  can	  be	  used	  to	  buy	  food	  products,	  resulting	  in	  a	  reduction	  in	  food	  security.	   In	  the	  summer	  of	  2011,	  Sun	  Biofuels	  declared	  bankruptcy	  and	  almost	  600	  people	  lost	  their	  jobs,	  thus	  leaving	  villagers	  unemployed	  with	  no	  income	  and	  without	  the	  land	  that	  they	  previously	  used	  for	  subsistence	  activities	  (Focus	  on	  Land	  in	  Africa,	  2010,	  p.	  6).	  A	  new	  company,	  3o	  Degrees	  East,	  has	  acquired	  ownership	  of	  most	  of	  the	  former	  Sun	  Biofuels	  shares,	  without	  informing	  the	  village	  councils.	  This	  perpetuates	  the	  undermining	  of	  local	  village	  management	  of	  the	  land	  and,	  again,	  violates	  FPIC	  regulations.	  30	  Degrees	  East	  continues	  to	  employ	  security	  surrounding	  the	  property,	  so	  the	  villagers	  still	  have	  no	  access	  to	  the	  land.	  As	  Sun	  Biofuels	  went	  bankrupt,	  the	  company	  could	  not	  pay	  the	  district	  officials	  all	  of	  the	  money	  owed.	  Therefore,	  no	  compensation	  has	  been	  provided	  for	  the	  villagers,	  thus	  resulting	  in	  the	  cyclical	  marginalization	  of	  local	  villagers	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  spur	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  government’s	  and	  multinational	  corporation’s	  favor.	  As	  the	  Tanzanian	  district	  officials	  displaced	  villagers	  from	  village	  lands	  used	  for	  subsistence	  activities,	  these	  villagers	  were	  left	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  capitalist	  system	  in	  place	  to	  purchase	  household	  goods	  and	  food,	  instead	  of	  relying	  on	  the	  natural	  world	  to	  provide	  for	  these	  things	  without	  the	  need	  for	  income,	  which	  further	  pushes	  these	  people	  into	  poverty. I	  am	  going	  to	  shift	  focus	  to	  a	  REDD+	  pilot	  program	  in	  Tanzania	  called	  “Advancing	  REDD	  in	  the	  Kolo	  Hills	  Forests”	  (ARKFor),	  which	  is	  an	  initiative	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  Kondoa	  District	  in	  central	  Tanzania	  (Tanzania	  Natural	  Resource	  Forum).	  The	  project	  goals	  are	  to	  connect	  conservation	  with	  poverty	  reduction	  by	  the	  means	  of	  introducing	  alternative	  livelihood	  strategies	  to	  local	  villagers,	  creating	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a	  carbon	  market	  that	  will	  provide	  positive	  incentives	  for	  villagers	  and	  reduce	  carbon	  concentrations	  in	  the	  atmosphere,	  and	  instituting	  capacity-­‐building	  mechanisms	  at	  the	  various	  management	  levels	  of	  forest	  governance	  (Likango,	  2013,	  p.	  14).	  This	  project	  is	  chiefly	  funded	  by	  the	  Norwegian	  government,	  as	  are	  the	  other	  REDD+	  projects	  in	  Tanzania,	  but	  the	  Norwegian	  government	  recognizes	  Non-­‐Governmental	  Organizations	  (NGOs)	  as	  the	  facilitators	  of	  these	  projects	  instead	  of	  the	  Tanzanian	  government	  (Likango,	  2013,	  p.	  13).	  This	  is	  due	  financial	  corruption	  within	  the	  Tanzanian	  forestry	  sector,	  in	  which	  Norwegian	  funds	  that	  were	  given	  to	  the	  government	  for	  various	  projects	  went	  missing	  and	  unaccounted	  for	  in	  the	  past.	  The	  African	  Wildlife	  Foundation	  (AWF)	  was	  the	  facilitator	  of	  the	  ARKFor	  project,	  which	  ran	  from	  2010	  until	  2013	  (United	  Republic	  of	  Tanzania).	  The	  project	  area	  consisted	  of	  56,000	  hectares	  (Likango,	  2013,	  p.	  13).	   The	  prescribed	  roles	  (per	  AWF)	  of	  the	  various	  participants	  are	  as	  follows:	  “Kolo	  community	  members	  are	  presented	  as	  the	  primary	  implementers	  and	  beneficiaries;	  the	  Norwegian	  Government	  is	  presented	  as	  the	  provider	  of	  financial	  support,	  advisor	  and	  overseer	  while	  AWF	  is	  put	  in	  the	  role	  as	  the	  project	  coordinator	  and	  facilitator”	  (Likango,	  2013,	  p.	  56).	  Likango’s	  (2013)	  interview	  with	  an	  official	  at	  the	  Norwegian	  Embassy	  located	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  noted	  that	  there	  is	  no	  formal	  contract	  binding	  an	  agreement	  between	  the	  Norwegian	  Embassy	  and	  the	  Kolo	  villagers	  (p.	  59).	  It	  is	  noted	  that	  the	  primary	  role	  of	  the	  villagers,	  in	  AWF’s	  terms,	  are	  to	  fully	  manage	  the	  forests	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Tanzanian	  forestry	  sector	  (Likango,	  2013,	  p.	  62).	  The	  proposed	  benefits	  the	  villagers	  were	  to	  receive	  included	  financial	  incentives,	  the	  installation	  of	  “energy	  efficient	  stoves	  [using	  a	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small	  amount	  of	  charcoal]...	  [the]	  introduction	  of	  hydro-­‐foam	  brick-­‐making	  technology…	  to	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  trees	  used	  in	  making	  clay	  bricks…	  [the	  villagers]	  would	  be	  supplied	  with	  tree	  seedlings	  so	  as	  to	  rely	  on	  home-­‐planted	  trees,	  and	  modern	  toilets	  would	  be	  constructed”	  (pg.	  64)	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  different	  livelihood	  strategies	  to	  discourage	  forest-­‐usage	  and	  detrimental	  agricultural	  practices	  (Likango,	  2013).	   The	  project	  funding	  was	  US	  $60,000,	  which	  was	  allocated	  to	  the	  21	  villages	  in	  the	  Kolo	  Hills	  area.	  In	  Likango’s	  (2013)	  interview	  with	  an	  AWF	  project	  member,	  the	  member	  mentioned	  that	  the	  money	  was	  not	  to	  go	  to	  the	  individual	  villagers,	  rather	  it	  should	  go	  to	  the	  village	  to	  construct	  offices	  and	  a	  registry	  of	  village	  land	  (p.	  65).	  These	  proposed	  benefits	  to	  the	  villagers	  were	  never	  formally	  written	  in	  a	  contract;	  the	  only	  record	  of	  the	  benefits	  can	  be	  found	  in	  recorded	  minutes	  from	  village	  meetings	  (Likango,	  2013,	  p.	  65).	  A	  problem	  with	  the	  proposed	  benefits	  is	  that	  the	  central	  government	  of	  Tanzania	  will	  first	  receive	  all	  payments	  and	  then	  distribute	  the	  benefits	  among	  the	  villages,	  which	  could	  potentially	  lead	  to	  corruption	  and	  improper	  management	  of	  the	  funds	  if	  one	  reflects	  on	  the	  corruption	  apparent	  in	  the	  Tanzanian	  forestry	  sector	  in	  the	  past	  (Likango,	  2013,	  p.	  66).	   Likango	  (2013)	  conducted	  interviews	  with	  various	  village	  members,	  some	  of	  which	  had	  opposing	  views	  of	  the	  ARKFor	  project.	  There	  were	  some	  villagers	  who	  were	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  program,	  most	  of	  which	  were	  leaders	  in	  the	  villages,	  whom	  said	  they	  were	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  project	  for	  the	  benefits	  that	  come	  with	  conservation	  and	  forest	  protection	  instead	  of	  the	  financial	  and	  livelihood	  incentives.	  Villagers	  who	  are	  not	  in	  leadership	  positions	  noted	  that	  these	  prominent	  leaders	  support	  the	  program	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because	  they	  have	  access	  to	  various	  project	  workshops	  and	  seminars,	  in	  which	  these	  leaders	  are	  given	  allowances.	  The	  financial	  allowance	  from	  the	  workshops	  and	  seminars	  may	  provoke	  an	  attitude	  among	  village	  leaders	  not	  to	  dissent	  with	  the	  project	  managers	  (Likango,	  2013,	  p.	  73).	   Other	  villagers	  have	  a	  contrasting	  view	  about	  the	  ARKFor	  project	  and	  believe	  it	  threatens	  their	  access	  to	  forest	  resources	  and	  they	  have	  not	  received	  the	  most	  of	  the	  proposed	  benefits	  (Likango,	  2013,	  p.	  74).	  In	  Likango’s	  (2013)	  survey	  of	  the	  villagers,	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  “some	  villagers	  told	  [Likango]	  that	  only	  two	  villagers	  had	  been	  given	  materials	  for	  modern	  toilet	  construction	  and	  only	  11	  villagers	  had	  been	  trained	  on	  good	  farming	  practice	  and	  received	  modern	  agricultural	  seeds”	  (p.	  74)	  and	  no	  villagers	  received	  financial	  compensation.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  formal	  binding	  contract	  between	  the	  donor,	  NGO,	  and	  villagers,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  villagers	  were	  not	  given	  what	  was	  promised.	  There	  is	  a	  noted	  lack	  of	  transparency	  with	  the	  ARKFor	  project	  in	  terms	  of	  finances.	   It	  was	  mentioned	  that	  most	  of	  the	  donor	  money	  has	  gone	  to	  AWF	  officials	  who	  carry	  out	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  aspects	  of	  the	  project,	  whereas	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  project,	  the	  villagers	  were	  deemed	  the	  implementers	  of	  the	  project	  (Likango,	  2013,	  p.	  75).	  This	  takes	  away	  project	  ownership	  from	  the	  villagers	  whom	  live	  on	  the	  project	  grounds.	  Villagers	  in	  opposition	  of	  the	  project	  believe	  that,	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  their	  former	  resources,	  they	  feel	  like	  “strangers	  in	  their	  own	  land”	  (p.	  80)	  a	  land	  in	  which	  they	  have	  conserved	  for	  generations	  by	  carrying	  out	  seemingly	  sustainable	  practices	  (Likango,	  2013).	  In	  many	  villagers’	  minds,	  the	  alternative	  livelihood	  strategies	  do	  not	  compensate	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  access	  to	  grazing	  land	  and	  areas	  to	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gather	  firewood	  (Likango,	  2013,	  p.	  76).	  The	  AWF	  project	  manager	  has	  noted	  that	  some	  benefits	  were	  not	  received	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  funding	  and	  incompetence	  of	  the	  contractor	  who	  was	  supposed	  to	  introduce	  alternative	  livelihood	  strategies	  (Likango,	  2013,	  p.	  77).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  ARKFor,	  community	  participation	  has	  been	  poor.	  This	  participation	  of	  local	  villagers	  is	  key	  to	  successfully	  implementing	  the	  ARKFor	  program	  because,	  without	  their	  participation,	  the	  program	  further	  marginalizes	  these	  villagers	  by	  taking	  away	  their	  land	  ownership	  and	  placing	  it	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  AWF.	  Many	  of	  the	  villagers	  view	  this	  program	  as	  unbeneficial	  because	  they	  can	  no	  longer	  rely	  on	  their	  traditional	  subsistence	  activities	  and	  have	  received	  little	  in	  return	  to	  make	  up	  for	  this	  loss.	  	  
 
Analysis,	  Policy	  Recommendations,	  and	  Conclusions 	   In	  this	  section,	  I	  discuss	  implications	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  may	  have	  on	  local	  land	  management	  by	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  forest	  users.	  I	  connect	  findings	  found	  from	  the	  cases	  of	  natural	  resource	  extraction	  and	  the	  impacts	  these	  instances	  have	  had	  on	  traditional	  peoples	  with	  potential	  impacts	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  can	  have	  on	  these	  people	  if	  certain	  problems	  surrounding	  the	  natural	  resource	  cases	  are	  not	  solved,	  such	  as	  land	  tenure	  issues,	  following	  the	  principle	  of	  Free,	  Prior,	  and	  Informed	  Consent	  (FPIC),	  and	  centralized	  land	  management.	  I	  also	  evaluate	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  the	  REDD+	  pilot	  projects	  in	  Ecuador,	  Indonesia,	  and	  Tanzania,	  while	  making	  policy	  recommendations	  for	  future	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme,	  taking	  into	  account	  both	  resolution	  of	  negative	  effects	  from	  the	  natural	  resource	  extraction	  cases	  and	  beneficial	  and	  detrimental	  aspects	  of	  the	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REDD+	  pilot	  projects.	  First,	  I	  explain	  about	  each	  case	  study	  individually.	  I	  then	  discuss	  implications	  and	  recommendations	  for	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme,	  as	  a	  whole. 
Ecuador	    In	  Ecuador,	  the	  government	  claims	  ownership	  of	  subsurface	  oil	  and	  minerals	  below	  lands.	  Although	  indigenous	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users	  legally	  can	  hold	  land	  tenure,	  the	  government	  can	  still	  extract	  natural	  resources	  from	  below	  the	  surface.	  Although	  natural	  resource	  extraction	  is	  not	  explicitly	  linked	  to	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme,	  natural	  resource	  extraction	  results	  in	  deforestation	  and,	  sometimes,	  the	  eviction	  of	  local	  indigenous	  peoples	  from	  their	  ancestral	  lands.	  Thus,	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users	  should	  hold	  land	  tenure	  of	  both	  the	  land	  and	  the	  subsurface	  oil	  and	  minerals	  so	  that	  their	  traditional	  land	  rights	  cannot	  be	  harmed	  by	  natural	  resource	  extraction.	  This	  does	  tend	  to	  happen	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  world	  regardless	  of	  land	  tenure	  rights,	  but	  possessing	  land	  tenure	  would	  give	  indigenous	  inhabitants	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users	  more	  legal	  security	  in	  the	  case	  of	  land	  grabs.	  The	  encroachment	  on	  the	  Huaorani’s	  land	  due	  to	  oil	  development	  in	  the	  Chevron	  case	  represents	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  indigenous	  peoples	  were	  forcibly	  evicted	  by	  the	  Ecuadorian	  government,	  which	  exhibits	  a	  level	  of	  distrust	  between	  the	  Ecuadorian	  government	  and	  indigenous	  groups.	  In	  order	  to	  create	  beneficial	  national	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme,	  trust	  and	  capacity	  building	  activities	  will	  need	  to	  take	  place	  in	  Ecuador	  to	  form	  a	  new	  level	  of	  trust	  between	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  the	  government.	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Also,	  in	  the	  Chevron	  case,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  indigenous	  peoples’	  rights	  to	  their	  land	  and	  traditional	  livelihoods	  were	  affected	  by	  the	  incursion	  of	  a	  transnational	  corporation	  onto	  their	  lands.	  The	  government	  profited	  from	  working	  with	  Chevron,	  while	  the	  indigenous	  peoples	  did	  not	  receive	  any	  compensation.	  I	  relate	  this	  to	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme’s	  provision	  of	  funding	  for	  national	  REDD+	  projects.	  If	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  is	  to	  be	  beneficial	  and	  equitable	  to	  all	  people	  involved	  in	  each	  national	  project,	  then	  a	  transparent	  funding	  structure	  needs	  to	  be	  created.	  Financial	  benefits	  for	  indigenous	  peoples	  whose	  land	  is	  used	  for	  national	  REDD+	  programs	  need	  to	  be	  outlined	  in	  a	  formal	  contract.	  FPIC	  principles	  were	  not	  followed	  when	  Chevron	  began	  extracting	  natural	  resources	  from	  Huaorani	  land,	  which	  generated	  feelings	  of	  distrust	  between	  the	  indigenous	  Huaorani	  and	  the	  government.	  In	  order	  for	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  to	  work,	  FPIC	  needs	  to	  be	  respected	  and	  indigenous	  groups	  need	  to	  be	  included	  in	  a	  democratic	  decision-­‐making	  process.	   Another	  example	  I	  presented	  of	  natural	  resource	  extraction	  in	  Ecuador	  deals	  with	  the	  failed	  Yasuni	  Initiative,	  in	  which	  Rafael	  Correa	  sought	  international	  funding	  to	  conserve	  the	  vast	  oil	  reserves	  below	  Yasuni	  National	  Park	  but	  relinquished	  the	  plan	  when	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  the	  desired	  funding	  did	  not	  come	  through.	  I	  support	  the	  notion	  that	  Correa	  may	  be	  more	  concerned	  with	  economic	  profit	  and	  capital	  development	  than	  land	  conservation,	  although	  the	  latter	  is	  what	  he	  initially	  sought,	  but	  only	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  economic	  profit.	  The	  director	  of	  Gaia	  Amazonas,	  Martin	  von	  Hildebrand,	  coined	  the	  project	  as	  “blackmail”	  because	  it	  exemplifies	  the	  belief	  that	  “biodiversity	  is	  only	  respected	  when	  and	  if	  the	  world	  pays,”	  holding	  the	  international	  community	  responsible	  for	  conservation	  efforts	  (GAIA	  Foundation).	  In	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this	  sense,	  Correa	  has	  failed	  to	  uphold	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  indigenous	  peoples	  living	  in	  the	  Yasuni	  National	  Park,	  creating	  evident	  distrust	  and	  opposition	  between	  the	  government	  of	  Ecuador	  and	  indigenous	  groups.	  Thus,	  I	  trust	  and	  respect	  will	  need	  to	  be	  formed	  between	  the	  government	  and	  indigenous	  groups	  if	  a	  national	  REDD+	  program	  is	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  indigenous	  peoples.	   	   Ecuador’s	  Socio	  Bosque	  Program,	  which	  is	  similar	  to	  REDD+	  programs	  except	  for	  that	  it	  is	  not	  funded	  by	  international	  donors,	  represents	  beneficial	  outcomes	  that	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  conservation	  programs	  that	  maintain	  carbon	  sinks,	  deter	  deforestation,	  and	  help	  mitigate	  climate	  change.	  In	  the	  Socio	  Bosque	  Program,	  participants	  are	  required	  to	  create	  carefully	  detailed	  investment	  plans,	  which	  provide	  transparency	  within	  the	  program.	  This	  is	  beneficial	  because	  it	  is	  known	  where	  the	  funding	  is	  going	  and	  how	  the	  funding	  will	  be	  used.	  In	  terms	  of	  indigenous	  groups,	  the	  investment	  plan	  requirement	  removes	  the	  doubt	  that	  funding	  may	  go	  to	  indigenous	  leaders	  and	  be	  misspent	  or	  used	  in	  a	  corrupt	  manner.	  In	  order	  for	  national	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  UN-­‐REDD	  to	  be	  successful,	  I	  think	  transparent	  funding	  plans	  will	  need	  to	  be	  created,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  equitable	  and	  beneficial	  to	  all	  actors	  involved.	  Although	  documents	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  establish	  the	  need	  for	  transparent	  funding	  plans,	  this	  will	  need	  to	  be	  enforced	  and	  monitored	  to	  prevent	  potential	  misuse	  and	  inequitable	  distribution	  of	  international	  funds.	  	  Another	  benefit	  of	  the	  Socio	  Bosque	  program	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  involve	  the	  international	  carbon-­‐trading	  market	  because	  it	  is	  a	  program	  that	  is	  funded	  solely	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  forest	  hectares	  conserved	  rather	  than	  receiving	  funding	  for	  actual	  and	  measurable	  results	  of	  emissions	  reductions	  like	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  UN-­‐REDD	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Indonesia 	   In	  Indonesia,	  indigenous	  territory	  remains	  under	  the	  “State	  Forestry”	  category,	  in	  which	  the	  Indonesian	  government	  has	  jurisdiction	  over	  these	  lands.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Freeport	  in	  Papua,	  Indonesia,	  the	  government	  signed	  a	  COW	  to	  give	  Freeport	  the	  right	  to	  remove	  and	  resettle	  indigenous	  Papuans	  from	  their	  land,	  while	  only	  providing	  compensation	  to	  the	  people	  for	  permanent	  structures	  (not	  natural	  resources,	  land,	  or	  water	  that	  are	  used	  in	  livelihood	  activities).	  It	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  give	  indigenous	  peoples	  control	  over	  their	  lands	  in	  Indonesia.	  This	  would	  be	  advantageous	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  national	  REDD+	  programs	  because	  the	  people	  would	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  support	  such	  programs,	  as	  they	  would	  have	  local	  control	  and	  drive	  to	  conserve	  these	  lands	  if	  they	  are	  their	  own.	  I	  see	  securing	  land	  tenure	  as	  an	  obstacle	  inhibiting	  the	  establishment	  of	  rewarding	  REDD+	  programs.	  As	  the	  indigenous	  Papuans	  were	  not	  consulted	  about	  the	  establishment	  of	  Freeport	  on	  their	  traditional	  lands,	  the	  principle	  of	  FPIC	  was	  not	  respected.	  Not	  only	  were	  these	  indigenous	  peoples’	  lands	  taken,	  but	  also	  many	  human	  rights	  violations	  occurred.	  Both	  the	  disregard	  for	  FPIC	  and	  the	  human	  rights	  violations	  represent	  distrust	  between	  the	  indigenous	  Papuans	  and	  the	  government	  of	  Indonesia.	  In	  order	  for	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  to	  succeed,	  trust	  building	  activities	  have	  to	  take	  place	  and	  FPIC	  will	  have	  to	  be	  respected.	  The	  principle	  of	  FPIC	  is	  required	  by	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  in	  the	  Framework	  Document,	  but	  will	  have	  to	  be	  respected	  and	  followed.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  human	  rights	  violations	  and	  removal	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  from	  their	  ancestral	  lands	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  spur	  economic	  profit	  by	  working	  with	  a	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multinational	  corporation,	  I	  support	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  government	  of	  Indonesia	  is	  more	  concerned	  about	  economic	  profit	  than	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  indigenous	  Papuans,	  a	  group	  which	  I	  tie	  to	  the	  greater	  indigenous	  community	  of	  Indonesia.	  In	  order	  for	  a	  REDD+	  program	  to	  succeed	  in	  Indonesia,	  I	  believe	  the	  government	  of	  Indonesia	  has	  to	  show	  respect	  toward	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  provide	  transparent	  funding	  schemes	  that	  exhibit	  funds	  are	  going	  to	  indigenous	  groups	  who	  reside	  in	  national	  REDD+	  program	  areas.	  	  Another	  point	  I	  would	  like	  to	  make	  about	  the	  Freeport	  case	  is	  that	  the	  “One	  Percent	  Trust	  Fund	  Offer”	  creates	  a	  dependency	  relationship	  between	  the	  indigenous	  community	  and	  foreign	  funding.	  There	  is	  a	  potential	  this	  could	  happen	  with	  REDD+,	  as	  indigenous	  peoples	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  support	  themselves	  under	  traditional	  subsistence	  systems	  (due	  to	  the	  conservation	  of	  forests	  and	  exclusion	  from	  using	  these	  forests’	  resources	  under	  some	  REDD+	  programs)	  and	  may	  rely	  on	  UN-­‐REDD	  funding	  for	  livelihood	  support.	  In	  this	  case,	  although	  indigenous	  peoples	  tend	  to	  live	  more	  traditionally	  and	  sometimes	  do	  not	  take	  part	  in	  the	  capitalist	  market	  system	  (although,	  increasingly,	  they	  are	  having	  to	  due	  to	  outside	  forces),	  outside	  options	  for	  income	  should	  be	  made	  available	  to	  these	  people	  to	  reduce	  dependency	  on	  foreign	  aid.	  As	  the	  Freeport	  case	  represents	  the	  exploitation	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  essence	  to	  spur	  economic	  profit	  that	  benefits	  a	  transnational	  corporation	  and	  the	  Indonesian	  government,	  REDD+	  programs	  will	  have	  to	  be	  beneficial	  to	  these	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  terms	  of	  allowing	  them	  to	  live	  plentiful	  lives	  and	  not	  continue	  the	  cycle	  of	  oppression.	  Again,	  I	  note	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  provide	  transparent	  funding	  schemes	  to	  prevent	  mismanagement	  of	  funds. 
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   A	  REDD+	  pilot	  project	  in	  Indonesia,	  The	  Kalimantan	  Forests	  and	  Climate	  Partnership	  (KFCP),	  provides	  some	  insight	  about	  improvements	  that	  should	  be	  made	  to	  national	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD.	  As	  “ulayat”	  rights,	  or	  customary	  land	  rights,	  are	  not	  protected	  by	  the	  government	  under	  the	  Basic	  Agrarian	  Law	  of	  1960,	  the	  KFCP	  undermined	  the	  ability	  of	  local	  land	  managers	  to	  work	  in	  the	  program	  and	  serve	  as	  equal	  partners	  by,	  instead,	  working	  with	  the	  Forestry	  Department.	  Land	  tenure	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  Indonesia	  should	  be	  secured	  because	  the	  local	  people	  will	  probably	  be	  more	  apt	  to	  get	  involved	  with	  a	  REDD+	  program	  that	  may	  take	  place	  on	  their	  lands.	  In	  order	  for	  a	  REDD+	  program	  to	  work,	  local	  peoples	  need	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  establishment	  of	  a	  beneficial	  program.	  Many	  of	  these	  indigenous	  people	  hold	  ancient	  knowledge	  about	  the	  land	  and	  its	  resources;	  this	  is	  a	  point	  that	  should	  be	  respected	  by	  international	  partners	  in	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  and	  used	  as	  a	  benefit	  to	  create	  a	  valuable	  REDD+	  program.	  The	  Dayaks	  were	  not	  actual	  participants	  in	  the	  project.	  In	  order	  for	  a	  REDD+	  program	  to	  be	  successful,	  the	  local	  people	  need	  to	  active	  participants	  and	  community	  involvement	  is	  needed.	  This	  will	  alleviate	  the	  potential	  of	  conflicts	  and	  will	  give	  local	  people	  control	  over	  their	  resources,	  thus	  holding	  to	  a	  more	  decentralized	  form	  of	  forest	  management	  versus	  centralized	  forest	  management	  under	  the	  national	  government.	  	  Another	  negative	  aspect	  I	  would	  like	  to	  point	  out	  about	  this	  program	  is	  that	  FPIC	  was	  not	  respected;	  the	  Dayak	  people	  have	  been	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  KFCP	  since	  its	  start	  because	  the	  KFCP	  never	  asked	  for	  consent	  of	  the	  Dayak	  peoples	  about	  this	  project.	  The	  Dayaks	  were	  not	  informed	  of	  the	  project	  scope,	  the	  changes	  the	  project	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Tanzania 	   In	  Tanzania,	  I	  use	  the	  case	  of	  Sun	  Biofuels	  to	  identify	  injustices	  felt	  by	  the	  local	  Tanzanian	  villagers	  and	  the	  effects	  the	  establishment	  of	  Sun	  Biofuels	  has	  had	  on	  their	  traditional	  livelihoods	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  correlate	  this	  with	  the	  potential	  effects	  REDD+	  projects	  may	  have	  on	  villagers’	  access	  to	  local	  land	  and	  resources.	  There	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  the	  Land	  Act	  and	  the	  Village	  Land	  Act	  in	  Tanzania;	  there	  are	  contrasting	  definitions	  of	  “General	  Land.”	  Under	  the	  Land	  Act,	  “unoccupied	  or	  unused	  village	  land”	  can	  be	  deemed	  General	  Land,	  whereas	  the	  Village	  Land	  Act	  sees	  unoccupied	  village	  land	  as	  areas	  for	  subsistence	  activities,	  thus	  Village	  Land.	  Under	  the	  Village	  Land	  Act,	  General	  Land	  is	  land	  that	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  Reserved	  Land	  or	  Village	  Land.	  This	  contradiction	  needs	  to	  be	  removed	  and	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  one	  overarching	  definition	  so	  that	  the	  villagers	  do	  not	  lose	  a	  right	  to	  unoccupied	  village	  land,	  even	  though	  this	  land	  may	  only	  be	  used	  for	  subsistence	  activities.	  This	  will	  be	  beneficial	  to	  the	  establishment	  REDD+	  programs	  in	  Tanzania.	  Villagers	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  favor	  of	  REDD+	  programs	  on	  and	  near	  their	  land	  if	  they	  have	  land	  tenure	  security	  over	  all	  customary	  lands,	  even	  if	  the	  land	  is	  unoccupied	  but	  used	  for	  subsistence	  activities.	  This	  will	  also	  give	  the	  villagers	  protection	  from	  government	  land	  takings,	  in	  which	  the	  government	  may	  take	  unoccupied	  village	  land	  to	  use	  for	  industrial	  and	  agricultural	  purposes	  or	  for	  REDD+	  purposes.	  	  Also	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Sun	  Biofuels,	  FPIC	  was	  not	  respected.	  There	  is	  a	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  Tanzanian	  government’s	  and	  Sun	  Biofuels’	  viewpoints	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  biofuel	  plantation	  and	  the	  villagers’	  viewpoints	  on	  it.	  The	  meetings	  that	  were	  held	  were	  informational,	  but	  non-­‐negotiable.	  Under	  the	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principle	  of	  FPIC,	  meetings	  need	  to	  be	  negotiable	  and	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  projects	  must	  be	  stated.	  When	  Sun	  Biofuels	  was	  established,	  information	  about	  the	  benefits	  were	  presented,	  but	  not	  the	  detrimental	  effects	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  company	  would	  have	  on	  the	  villagers’	  livelihoods	  and	  subsistence	  activities.	  In	  order	  for	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  UN-­‐REDD	  to	  be	  successful,	  FPIC	  needs	  to	  be	  both	  informational	  and	  democratic	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  Villagers’	  views	  need	  to	  be	  respected	  as	  equal	  to	  the	  government’s	  views.	  The	  benefits	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  Sun	  Biofuels	  were	  never	  solidified	  on	  paper.	  Formal	  agreements	  on	  paper	  need	  to	  be	  created	  within	  REDD+	  projects	  to	  hold	  the	  Tanzanian	  government,	  outside	  actors,	  and	  involved	  NGOs	  accountable	  and	  for	  evidence	  of	  approved	  consent.	  Without	  approved	  consent	  and	  accountability,	  it	  is	  possible	  local	  villagers	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  marginalized	  and	  oppressed	  by	  these	  other	  actors.	  Inclusivity	  of	  villagers	  and	  participation	  is	  key	  where	  REDD+	  programs	  are	  established-­‐-­‐	  it	  is	  apparent	  the	  villagers	  near	  the	  Sun	  Biofuels	  cultivation	  area	  were	  marginalized	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  spur	  economic	  growth	  for	  the	  Tanzanian	  government	  and	  a	  multinational	  corporation.	  Transparent	  funding	  structures	  need	  to	  be	  created	  to	  avoid	  corruption	  and	  the	  mismanagement	  of	  funds. 	   The	  Kolo	  Hills	  pilot	  project	  in	  Tanzania	  provides	  opportunities	  for	  improvement	  within	  REDD+	  programs.	  In	  the	  Kolo	  Hills	  project,	  no	  formal	  contract	  was	  created	  between	  the	  Norwegian	  Embassy	  and	  the	  villagers	  that	  noted	  the	  proposed	  benefits	  the	  villagers	  were	  supposed	  to	  receive	  in	  the	  program.	  This	  is	  necessary	  in	  future	  REDD+	  programs	  for	  formality	  and	  accountability,	  in	  which	  NGOS	  and	  the	  Tanzanian	  government	  can	  be	  held	  accountable	  if	  the	  proposed	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benefits	  to	  local	  forest-­‐users	  are	  not	  actual.	  In	  this	  REDD+	  program	  (and	  others	  in	  Tanzania),	  the	  proposed	  financial	  benefits	  received	  from	  the	  conservation	  of	  forests	  and	  the	  carbon	  within	  these	  forests	  will	  go	  to	  the	  central	  government	  of	  Tanzania,	  who	  will	  then	  distribute	  the	  funds	  among	  the	  villages.	  This	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  lead	  to	  corruption	  and	  improper	  management	  of	  funds	  if	  one	  reflects	  on	  the	  past	  corruption	  apparent	  in	  the	  Tanzanian	  forestry	  sector.	  This	  presents	  an	  area	  for	  improvement	  within	  REDD+	  programs	  in	  Tanzania,	  in	  which	  funding	  allocation	  should	  be	  distributed	  differently.	  A	  transparent	  funding	  structure	  should	  be	  created	  and	  show	  exactly	  where	  all	  of	  the	  funds	  are	  going	  to.	  	  It	  was	  noted	  in	  the	  Kolo	  Hills	  program	  that	  allowances	  were	  given	  to	  village	  leaders	  during	  REDD+	  workshops.	  In	  future	  REDD+	  programs,	  all	  villagers	  should	  be	  invited	  to	  the	  meetings	  and	  the	  funds	  should	  be	  distributed	  equitably	  among	  all	  villagers	  or	  allowances	  should	  not	  be	  given	  to	  anyone	  at	  all.	  This	  will	  allow	  for	  unbiased	  decision-­‐making	  surrounding	  the	  project,	  in	  which	  villagers	  will	  not	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  coerced	  into	  a	  project	  they	  do	  not	  support.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Kolo	  Hills	  project,	  the	  villagers	  were	  deemed	  participants	  in	  the	  program	  and	  given	  responsibility	  to	  carry	  out	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  aspects	  of	  the	  project.	  Instead,	  Kolo	  Hills	  villagers	  mentioned	  they	  were	  not	  included	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  workings	  of	  the	  project	  and	  that	  the	  AWF	  officials	  mainly	  carried	  it	  out.	  In	  order	  for	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  UN-­‐REDD	  to	  work,	  local	  participation	  is	  crucial	  for	  these	  people	  to	  want	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  project,	  respect	  it,	  and	  to	  not	  feel	  like	  outsiders	  on	  their	  own	  land.	  Lastly,	  alternative	  livelihood	  strategies	  were	  promised	  by	  program	  leaders.	  Villagers	  noted	  the	  alternative	  livelihood	  strategies	  proposed	  by	  the	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program	  leaders	  did	  not	  make	  up	  for	  their	  loss	  of	  access	  to	  grazing	  land	  and	  areas	  to	  gather	  firewood.	  In	  order	  for	  REDD+	  projects	  to	  be	  successful,	  the	  local	  peoples	  in	  and	  near	  the	  project	  area	  need	  to	  have	  alternative	  livelihood	  strategies	  that	  work	  and	  can	  provide	  them	  with	  the	  materials	  and	  funds	  they	  have	  lost	  from	  losing	  their	  access	  to	  traditional	  land.	  	  
 
Policy	  Recommendations	  and	  Conclusions 	   As	  noted	  above,	  there	  are	  many	  opportunities	  for	  improvement	  in	  REDD+	  projects	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme.	  Improvements	  should	  be	  made	  to	  the	  Programme	  so	  that	  local	  and	  decentralized	  management	  is	  favored	  over	  centralized	  management,	  because	  centralized	  management	  could	  lead	  to	  loss	  of	  local	  land	  ownership	  and	  local	  peoples	  may	  feel	  aversion	  toward	  REDD+	  projects.	  The	  main	  areas	  that	  need	  to	  be	  focused	  on	  include	  building	  trust,	  creating	  transparent	  funding	  structures,	  respecting	  the	  principle	  of	  FPIC,	  allowing	  for	  democratic	  decision-­‐making	  when	  implementing	  REDD+	  programs,	  respecting	  customary	  land	  tenure	  of	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users,	  and	  creating	  beneficial	  alternative	  livelihood	  strategies	  for	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  forest	  users	  who	  are	  involved	  in	  REDD+	  programs.	  	  A	  main	  area	  to	  be	  improved	  upon	  is	  land	  tenure	  security.	  In	  Ecuador,	  although	  indigenous	  groups	  hold	  land	  tenure	  over	  their	  lands,	  they	  do	  not	  hold	  land	  tenure	  over	  subsurface	  minerals.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Indonesia,	  indigenous	  land	  remains	  under	  the	  “State	  Forestry”	  category,	  in	  which	  the	  Indonesian	  government	  has	  sole	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  lands.	  The	  Tanzanian	  Land	  Act	  holds	  that	  unoccupied	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Village	  Land	  can	  be	  deemed	  General	  Land,	  thus	  taking	  away	  villagers’	  land	  tenure	  security	  over	  these	  lands	  used	  for	  subsistence	  activities.	  In	  order	  for	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  UN-­‐REDD	  to	  be	  beneficial	  and	  hold	  to	  a	  more	  local	  level	  of	  land	  management,	  these	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  local	  villagers	  will	  need	  to	  hold	  land	  tenure	  over	  their	  traditional	  lands.	  This	  will	  allow	  for	  the	  use	  of	  local	  knowledge	  when	  managing	  the	  lands	  and	  evoke	  a	  greater	  drive	  of	  these	  local	  peoples	  to	  participate	  in	  REDD+	  projects.	  If	  this	  is	  not	  done,	  land	  management	  will	  remain	  centralized	  in	  fashion	  and	  will	  deter	  these	  local	  peoples’	  abilities	  to	  manage	  the	  lands	  on	  which	  they	  live.	  This	  will	  require	  policy	  reform	  of	  national	  laws	  surrounding	  customary	  and	  collective	  land	  tenure. 	   Another	  area	  that	  will	  need	  to	  be	  improved	  upon	  if	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  are	  to	  work	  and	  forest	  management	  remains	  decentralized	  under	  a	  more	  local	  level	  of	  management	  is	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  FPIC	  must	  be	  respected	  and	  enforced.	  If	  FPIC	  is	  not	  respected,	  the	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  UN-­‐REDD	  may	  undermine	  the	  local	  management	  of	  resources	  by	  holding	  to	  more	  national	  and	  international	  levels	  of	  resource	  management	  and	  not	  allowing	  the	  local	  peoples	  to	  have	  a	  voice	  about	  what	  may	  take	  place	  on	  their	  land,	  thus	  becoming	  more	  centralized.	  In	  all	  of	  the	  cases	  of	  natural	  resource	  extraction	  in	  Ecuador,	  Indonesia,	  and	  Tanzania,	  the	  indigenous	  and	  local	  people	  were	  either	  evicted	  or	  lost	  their	  access	  to	  local	  land	  for	  subsistence	  activities	  without	  giving	  consent	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  order	  for	  these	  local	  people	  to	  support	  REDD+	  programs	  and	  be	  local	  actors	  in	  managing	  the	  program,	  informational	  and	  negotiable	  meetings	  must	  take	  place,	  with	  democratic	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  in	  place	  to	  give	  local	  people	  jurisdiction	  over	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their	  lands.	  As	  these	  cases	  of	  natural	  resource	  extraction	  have	  formed	  distrust	  between	  local	  peoples	  and	  their	  national	  governments,	  trust	  and	  capacity-­‐building	  activities	  will	  need	  to	  take	  place	  if	  REDD+	  programs	  are	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  local	  peoples.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  KFCP	  in	  Indonesia,	  local	  land	  managers	  were	  not	  included	  to	  work	  on	  the	  project.	  Instead,	  the	  AWF	  worked	  with	  the	  Indonesian	  Forestry	  Department,	  which	  undermined	  local	  land	  management	  of	  this	  area	  and	  held	  to	  a	  centralized	  form	  of	  management.	  In	  order	  to	  allow	  for	  decentralized	  management	  of	  local	  lands	  and	  REDD+	  projects,	  the	  local	  people	  need	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  equal	  partners.	  Community	  involvement	  is	  crucial	  and	  the	  local	  people	  need	  to	  be	  active	  participants	  in	  the	  program,	  in	  order	  to	  alleviate	  conflicts	  between	  the	  local	  people	  and	  the	  national	  governments,	  NGOs,	  and	  foreign	  actors.	   	   For	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  to	  be	  beneficial	  to	  the	  local	  people	  involved	  and	  hold	  to	  a	  more	  decentralized	  level	  of	  forest	  management,	  transparent	  funding	  structures	  are	  needed.	  In	  all	  of	  the	  natural	  resource	  extraction	  cases	  presented	  in	  the	  case	  studies,	  the	  national	  governments	  and	  international	  corporations	  profited	  while	  the	  local	  and	  indigenous	  peoples	  received	  no	  compensation.	  Again,	  this	  formed	  a	  breach	  of	  trust	  between	  the	  local	  peoples	  and	  the	  government,	  while	  creating	  a	  loss	  of	  resources	  and	  livelihood	  activities	  for	  these	  local	  people.	  Financial	  benefits	  for	  indigenous	  and	  local	  people	  need	  to	  be	  outlined	  in	  a	  formal	  contract	  in	  REDD+	  programs,	  in	  order	  to	  hold	  governments	  and	  foreign	  actors	  accountable.	  This	  beneficial	  transparent	  funding	  plan	  is	  apparent	  in	  Ecuador’s	  Socio	  Bosque	  Program,	  in	  which	  carefully	  detailed	  investment	  plans	  provide	  funding	  transparency.	  This	  removes	  the	  doubt	  that	  funding	  may	  be	  
76	  
misspent	  by	  national	  governments	  and	  will	  exhibit	  equitability	  and	  beneficiality	  of	  funds	  for	  local	  peoples.	  For	  REDD+	  programs	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  local	  management	  and	  providing	  benefits	  to	  the	  local	  peoples,	  the	  distribution	  of	  funds	  according	  to	  funding	  plans	  will	  need	  to	  be	  enforced	  and	  monitored.	  This	  could	  be	  done	  be	  a	  third	  party	  actor,	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  unbiased	  oversight.	   	   Other	  opportunities	  for	  improvement	  include	  using	  more-­‐direct	  “Payments	  for	  Ecosystems	  Services,”	  like	  the	  conservation	  of	  forest	  hectares,	  for	  some	  programs	  instead	  of	  the	  carbon-­‐trading	  market	  in	  terms	  of	  REDD+	  funding	  for	  projects.	  Although	  this	  would	  shift	  some	  of	  the	  REDD+	  programs,	  more-­‐direct	  PES	  would	  give	  local	  and	  indigenous	  people	  funding	  for	  forests	  that	  they	  have	  been	  conserving	  all	  along.	  Some	  programs	  should	  not	  account	  for	  additionality	  because	  some	  local	  and	  indigenous	  people	  have	  been	  living	  in	  a	  sustainable	  mindset	  all	  along	  and	  should	  be	  rewarded	  for	  this,	  instead	  of	  having	  to	  create	  more	  additional	  carbon	  offsets.	  Also,	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  UN-­‐REDD	  should	  provide	  alternative	  livelihood	  strategies	  and	  outside	  sources	  of	  income	  for	  local	  forest-­‐users	  and	  indigenous	  peoples.	  If	  these	  are	  not	  provided,	  there	  is	  a	  great	  chance	  these	  people	  will	  become	  dependent	  on	  foreign	  aid.	  The	  alternative	  livelihood	  strategies	  must	  provide	  adequate	  compensation	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  land	  for	  subsistence	  activities.	  	   Lastly,	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users	  need	  to	  organize,	  in	  order	  to	  make	  various	  issues	  like	  indigenous	  land	  grabs	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  holding	  customary	  land	  tenure	  known	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  Although	  some	  groups	  have	  already	  organized	  and	  are	  making	  various	  indigenous	  rights	  issues	  known	  to	  the	  world,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  more	  activism	  surrounding	  the	  issues	  of	  land	  tenure	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security	  and	  unjust	  land	  grabs	  because	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users	  are	  still	  continually	  marginalized	  by	  national	  governments	  and	  multinational	  corporations	  in	  this	  respect.	  I	  think	  this	  needs	  to	  go	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  the	  efforts	  of	  conservation	  that	  are	  outlined	  in	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme,	  so	  as	  to	  hold	  to	  more	  decentralized	  forms	  of	  land	  management	  and	  allowing	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users	  to	  locally	  manage	  forests.	  If	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  traditional	  forest	  users	  organize,	  there	  is	  a	  great	  chance	  that	  issues	  of	  land	  tenure	  security	  and	  unjust	  land	  grabs	  can	  be	  solved	  by	  proposing	  changes	  to	  national	  laws	  and	  policies.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  will	  become	  more	  aware	  of	  these	  issues	  and	  aid	  in	  lobbying	  for	  the	  change	  of	  laws.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  may	  undermine	  the	  local	  management	  of	  resources	  by	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  forest	  dependent	  peoples	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  hold	  to	  more	  national	  and	  international	  levels	  of	  resource	  management.	  I	  have	  done	  this	  by	  the	  presentation	  of	  three	  case	  studies	  on	  three	  different	  countries:	  Ecuador,	  Indonesia,	  and	  Tanzania.	  As	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  is	  relatively	  new,	  I	  have	  provided	  two	  different	  directions	  within	  each	  case	  study	  to	  view	  the	  potential	  implications	  national	  REDD+	  programs	  under	  the	  UN-­‐REDD	  Programme	  may	  have	  on	  indigenous	  groups	  and	  local	  forest	  users	  by	  focusing	  on	  cases	  of	  natural	  resource	  extraction	  and	  REDD+	  pilot	  programs.	  I	  have	  presented	  an	  instance	  in	  which	  indigenous	  peoples’	  or	  local	  forest	  users’	  rights	  to	  land	  tenure	  security,	  rights	  to	  FPIC,	  rights	  as	  equal	  partners,	  and	  rights	  to	  transparent	  funding	  structures	  have	  been	  harmed	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  natural	  resource	  extraction	  or	  agricultural	  cultivation.	  In	  regard	  to	  these	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